Diamonds are Forever by Dorr, Cian & Goodman, Jeremy
 1	
Diamonds	are	Forever	Cian	Dorr	and	Jeremy	Goodman		
Penultimate	draft	(December	2018)	Forthcoming	in	Noûs	
Abstract	We	defend	the	thesis	 that	every	necessarily	 true	proposition	 is	always	true.	 	Since	not	every	proposition	that	is	always	true	is	necessarily	true,	our	thesis	is	at	odds	with	theories	of	 modality	 and	 time,	 such	 as	 those	 of	 Kit	 Fine	 and	 David	 Kaplan,	 which	 posit	 a	fundamental	symmetry	between	modal	and	tense	operators.		According	to	such	theories,	just	as	 it	 is	a	contingent	matter	what	 is	 true	at	a	given	time,	 it	 is	 likewise	a	 temporary	matter	what	 is	 true	at	 a	given	possible	world;	 so	a	proposition	 that	 is	now	 true	at	 all	worlds,	and	thus	necessarily	true,	may	yet	at	some	past	or	future	time	be	false	in	the	actual	world,	and	thus	not	always	true.	We	reconstruct	and	criticize	several	lines	of	argument	in	favor	 of	 this	 picture,	 and	 then	 argue	 against	 the	 picture	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	 is	inconsistent	with	certain	sorts	of	contingency	in	the	structure	of	time.	
I. 		
Nothing	 impossible	 has	 ever	 happened.	 	 If	 a	 proposition	 is	necessarily	 true,	 then	 it	 is	always	true.		Call	this	principle	Perpetuity.		Obvious	as	it	sounds,	Perpetuity	has	fallen	on	hard	times.		We	aim	to	defend	it.1			Three	points	of	clarification.		First:	Some	philosophers	are	propositional	eternalists—they	think	that	every	true	proposition	is	always	true.		On	this	view,	Perpetuity	is	true	but	uninteresting,	since	it	is	uncontroversial	that	every	necessarily	true	proposition	is	true.		
                                               1	Assuming	an	S5	logic	of	necessity,	Perpetuity	is	equivalent	to	the	principle	that	what	is	possibly	true	is	always	possibly	true—hence	our	title.		Proof:	Suppose	p	is	possibly	true;	then	it	is	necessarily	possibly	true	(by	the	5	axiom),	and	is	therefore	always	possibly	true	(by	Perpetuity).		In	the	other	direction,	suppose	p	is	necessarily	true;	then	it	is	possibly	necessarily	true	(by	the	T	axiom),	and	is	therefore	always	possibly	necessarily	true	(by	the	 titular	principle).	 	 Since	possible	necessary	 truth	entails	 truth	 (by	 the	B	axiom),	 it	follows	by	the	closure	of	‘always’	under	entailment	that	p	is	always	true.			
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We	 think	 that	 even	 propositional	 temporalists—those	 who	 deny	 propositional	eternalism—should	accept	Perpetuity.		We	will	therefore	proceed	on	the	assumption	that	there	are	some	temporarily	true	propositions.					Second:	 Some	 philosophers	 are	 nominalists	 and	 think	 that	 there	 aren’t	 any	propositions	at	all.	 	This	view	also	makes	Perpetuity	true	but	uninteresting.	 	Yet	surely	nominalists	should	want	to	find	some	way	of	reframing	the	debate	over	Perpetuity	that	renders	 it	non-trivial	by	 their	 lights—one	need	not	believe	 in	propositions	 to	wonder	whether	necessity	entails	eternity.		One	attractive	reframing	strategy	involves	replacing	quantification	over	propositions	with	quantification	 into	sentence	position.	The	debate	about	Perpetuity	will	then	be	reframed	as	a	debate	about	whether,	for	all	𝑝:	if	necessarily	𝑝,	 then	 always	𝑝.2		We	 think	 this	 is	 also	 a	 perfectly	 intelligible	 debate.	 	 Since	 in	what	follows	we	will	be	freely	intersubstituting	φ	and	⌜the	proposition	that	φ	is	true⌝,	it	would	be	 a	 trivial	 exercise	 to	 rewrite	 our	 discussion	 of	 Perpetuity	 using	 quantification	 into	sentence	position	in	place	of	quantification	over	propositions.3		Third:	 Perpetuity	 is	 a	 claim	 about	 metaphysical	 necessity.	 	 Given	 propositional	temporalism,	there	are	certainly	other	notions	of	necessity	which	do	not	entail	eternity.		For	example,	epistemic	necessity	does	not	entail	eternity,	since	the	proposition	that	there	are	dogs	 is	known	 to	be	 true	but	has	not	always	been	 true.	 	 Similarly,	 the	 “historical”	notion	of	necessity,	on	which	truths	about	the	past	are	automatically	necessary,	does	not	entail	eternity,	since	there	are	non-eternal	truths	about	the	past	(e.g.,	that	it	has	rained	at	least	once).		But	how	could	something	that	was	true	yesterday	be	metaphysically	impossible	today,	or	something	that	is	metaphysically	necessary	today	be	false	tomorrow?		We	hope	you	share	our	judgment	that	it	obviously	couldn’t	be.		If	you	do,	then	you	might	be	surprised	
                                               2	See	Prior	1971;	Williamson	2003,	§9;	Williamson	2013,	§5.9.	3	Even	those	who	harbor	no	doubts	about	the	existence	of	propositions	sometimes	reject	the	intersubstitutability	of	φ	and	⌜the	proposition	that	φ	is	true⌝.	For	example,	some	think	that	if	Socrates	had	not	existed,	then	the	proposition	that	Socrates	does	not	exist	would	not	have	existed	either,	and	so	would	not	have	been	true.		We	will	ignore	such	potential	complications	in	what	follows,	since	they	do	not,	so	far	as	we	can	tell,	have	any	bearing	on	
Perpetuity.		
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(as	we	were)	 to	 learn	that	 this	 judgment	of	obviousness	 is	 far	 from	universal.	 	 In	 fact,	
Perpetuity	 is	inconsistent	with	most	well-developed	theories	of	the	interaction	of	tense	and	modal	operators.		Admittedly,	many	of	those	who	develop	combined	modal-temporal	logics	do	not	specify	that	they	are	talking	about	metaphysical	necessity,	and	indeed	some	(e.g.	Thomason	1984)	are	explicitly	concerned	with	historical	necessity,	which	seems	on	its	face	to	be	something	altogether	different	from	metaphysical	necessity.4		But	two	of	the	most	 prominent	 treatments	 of	 the	 interaction	 of	 tense	 and	modality—David	 Kaplan’s	logic	 of	 demonstratives	 (1989),	 which	 is	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 much	 subsequent	theorizing	about	tense	and	modality	in	the	philosophy	of	language	and	formal	semantics,	and	Kit	Fine’s	modal	 tense	 logic	(1977),	which	has	been	 influential	 in	 the	metaphysics	literature—are	explicitly	concerned	with	metaphysical	necessity.5		While	neither	of	these	authors	explicitly	considers	Perpetuity,	as	we	shall	see	they	are	committed	to	its	falsity.		Meanwhile,	 many	 treatments	 of	 tense	 and	 modality	 in	 the	 linguistics	 literature	 are	intended	to	apply	to	all	available	readings	of	modal	adverbs	in	natural	language,	and	seem	to	 entail	 that	 Perpetuity	 is	 false	 no	 matter	 how	 we	 resolve	 the	 context-sensitivity	 of	‘necessarily’.6,	7	One	underlying	motivation	behind	these	views	is	the	desire	for	a	symmetric	treatment	of	modality	 and	 tense.	 	 For	 consider	 the	 converse	 of	Perpetuity:	 the	 claim	 that	 every	proposition	that	is	always	true	is	necessarily	true.		This	claim	is	clearly	false,	since	there	
                                               4 	This	 is	 not	 entirely	 obvious:	 some	 insist	 that	 “real”	 possibility	 requires	 historical	possibility,	where	 the	only	alternatives	are	 “slippery	 subjective	or	 linguistic	or	merely	mathematical	notions	of	possibility”	(Belnap	2012:	7).	Perhaps	given	these	remarks,	we	should	 interpret	 these	 philosophers	 as	 holding	 that	 historical	 and	 metaphysical	possibility	coincide.			5	Zalta	(1988)	also	clearly	embraces	principles	inconsistent	with	Perpetuity.			6	See,	e.g.,	Cresswell	1990;	Kaufmann,	Condoravdi,	and	Harizanov	2006;	Schlenker	2006;	and	Rini	and	Cresswell	2012.		More	carefully:	the	views	in	question	seem	to	entail	that	if	
propositional	temporalism	is	true	then	Perpetuity	is	false.		It	is	a	vexed	question	whether	or	not	such	views	take	a	stand	on	propositional	temporalism	(see	King	2003;	Ninan	2012;	Schaffer	2012).	7	We	take	it	that	in	adopting	a	metaphysical	interpretation	of	‘necessarily’	philosophers	are	exploiting	the	normal	context-sensitivity	of	the	natural-language	‘necessarily’	rather	than	 coining	 something	 altogether	 alien.	 This	 does	 not	 require	 thinking	 that	 the	metaphysical	interpretation	is	widespread	outside	of	philosophy.		
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are	metaphysically	contingent	propositions	that	are	always	true,	such	as	the	proposition	that	 sometimes	 it	 rains.8		Thus	Perpetuity,	 if	 true,	 constitutes	an	 important	asymmetry	between	necessity	and	eternity.		Since	 all	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 authors	 articulate	 their	 views	 in	 model-theoretic	terms,	getting	a	more	precise	understanding	of	their	view	will	require	a	model-theoretic	detour.	 	In	§II	we	define	a	class	of	“product	models”	for	a	simple	formal	language	with	modal	and	tense	operators,	and	show	that	Perpetuity	 is	inconsistent	with	propositional	temporalism	 in	 these	 models.	 	 In	 §III	 we	 present	 a	 more	 general	 class	 of	 “relational	structures”,	the	logic	of	which	we	will	treat	as	uncontroversial	in	what	follows.	This	will	allow	 us	 to	 isolate	 a	 principle	 Symmetry,	 which	 explicitly	 captures	 the	 aspect	 of	 our	opponents’	 view	 responsible	 for	 the	 incompatibility	 of	 Perpetuity	 and	 propositional	temporalism.	 	 	 In	§IV–§VII	we	consider	and	 respond	 to	 four	arguments	 for	Symmetry:	although	these	arguments	have	not	actually	been	given	in	the	literature,	they	are	valid	on	the	class	of	relational	structures	and	their	premises	are	both	philosophically	interesting	and	true	in	all	product	models.		(We	will	not	appeal	to	model-theoretic	considerations	in	assessing	these	arguments,	so	those	who	would	prefer	not	to	bother	with	model	theory	can	skip	§§II–III,	referring	to	§III	only	for	the	statements	of	Symmetry	and	an	equivalent	principle,	Supervenience.)		In	§§VIII-IX	we	argue	against	Symmetry	for	reasons	having	to	do	with	 contingency	 in	what	 times	 there	 are.	 	 In	 §X	we	 conclude	 by	 considering	 and	rejecting	the	suggestion	that	the	whole	debate	is	merely	verbal.		
                                               8	It	 is	not	entirely	unprecedented:	 the	Hellenistic	philosopher	Diodorus	Cronus	argued	that	 ‘the	 possible	 is	 that	 which	 either	 is	 or	 will	 be’,	 which	 entails	 (given	 a	 standard	conception	of	necessity	as	dual	to	possibility)	that	the	necessarily	true	propositions	are	exactly	those	that	are	true	and	always	will	be	true,	and	hence	include	all	the	eternal	truths;	but	 he	 may	 not	 have	 been	 talking	 about	 metaphysical	 necessity.	 	 For	 an	 influential	conjecture	 about	Diodorus’s	 argument	 see	 Prior	 1955.	 	 During	 the	medieval	 period	 it	became	 customary	 to	 distinguish	 a	 notion	 of	 “possibility	 per	 accidens”,	 conforming	 to	Diodorus’s	definition,	from	other,	less	demanding	notions	of	possibility—possibility	per	
se	and	God’s	possibility—for	which	analogues	of	Perpetuity	seem	to	have	been	accepted:	see	Knuutila	1982.	
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II. 		
In	this	section	we	will	define	a	class	of	“product	models”	for	a	formal	language	ℒ	containing	the	Boolean	connectives	¬	and	∧,	the	modal	operator	□	(‘necessarily’),	the	tense	operator	A	(‘always’),	and	infinitely	many	propositional	variables	𝑝𝑖	and	corresponding	universal	quantifiers	∀𝑝𝑖.		We	will	adopt	standard	abbreviations	for	∨,	→,	↔,	∃,	and	◇;	Sφ	(‘sometimes	φ’)	abbreviates	¬A¬φ.9			We	can	formalize	Perpetuity	in	ℒ	as	∀𝑝(□𝑝	→	A𝑝),	assuming	a	scheme	for	translating	ℒ	into	English	on	which	∀𝑝𝑖	is	translated	as	‘For	every	proposition	pi’,	while	occurrences	of	𝑝𝑖	in	sentence	position	are	translated	as	‘𝑝𝑖	is	true’.10	A	 product	 frame	 is	 any	 ordered	 pair	 ⟨W×T,	⟨α,	η⟩⟩	 such	 that	 ⟨α,	η⟩	∈	W×T.	 	 An	
assignment	 function	 on	 a	 product	 frame	 is	 a	 function	 from	 propositional	 variables	 to	subsets	of	W×T.	 	A	product	model	 is	 a	pair	 ⟨⟨W×T,	⟨α,	η⟩⟩,	⟦∙⟧⟩,	where	 ⟨W×T,	⟨α,η⟩⟩	 is	 a	product	frame	and	⟦∙⟧	is	the	unique	“interpretation	function”	that,	given	any	assignment	function	𝑔,	 maps	 each	 ℒ-formula	 φ	 to	 a	 subset	 ⟦φ⟧𝑔	 	 of	 W×T	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	following	recursive	definition:		 ⟦𝑝𝑖⟧𝑔	=	𝑔(𝑝𝑖)	⟦¬φ⟧𝑔	=	(W×T)	–	⟦φ⟧𝑔	⟦φ	∧	ψ⟧𝑔	=	⟦φ⟧𝑔	∩	ψ⟧𝑔	⟦□φ⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	:	⟨𝑤′,	𝑡⟩	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔	for	all	𝑤′	∈	W}	⟦Aφ⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	:	⟨𝑤,	𝑡′⟩	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔	for	all	𝑡′	∈	T}	
                                               9	ℒ	 is	 in	 this	respect	simpler	 than	the	 language	of	standard	tense	 logic,	 in	which	Aφ	is	usually	analyzed	in	terms	of	two	other	operators	H	(‘it	has	always	been	the	case	that’)	and	G	(‘it	will	always	be	the	case	that’)	as	Hφ	∧	φ	∧	Gφ.		10 	It	 is	 important	 to	 distinguish	 accepting	 Perpetuity—a	 quantified	 sentence—from	accepting	all	instances	of	the	schema	□φ	→	Aφ,	since	some	parties	to	the	debate	accept	
Perpetuity	without	accepting	the	schema.		For	example,	Salmon	(1983,	Appendix	C)	rejects	the	 schema	 □φ	→	Aφ	 but	 is	 a	 propositional	 eternalist	 and	 so	 certainly	 accepts	
Perpetuity.		One	way	of	making	sense	of	such	a	position	(although	not	Salmon’s	way)	is	to	think	of	tense	operators	as	binding	unpronounced	time	variables,	which	deictically	pick	out	particular	times	when	they	occur	free.		□φ	∧	¬Aφ	will	then	fail	to	entail	∃𝑝(□𝑝	∧	¬A𝑝)	for	the	same	reason	that	the	consistent	reading	of	‘He	is	happy	but	not	every	man	is	such	that	he	is	happy’	fails	to	entail	‘∃𝑝(𝑝	but	not	every	man	is	such	that	𝑝)’.		
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⟦∀𝑝𝑖φ⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	:	⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	∈	⟦φ⟧ℎ	for	all	assignment	functions	ℎ	that	agree	with	𝑔	on	all	variables	distinct	from	𝑝𝑖}.		φ	 is	 true	 in	 the	 product	 model	 ⟨⟨W×T,	⟨α,	η⟩⟩,	⟦∙⟧⟩	 on	 an	 assignment	 𝑔	 just	 in	 case	⟨α,	η⟩	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔.		A	closed	sentence	is	true	in	a	product	model	just	in	case	it	is	true	on	some	(or	equivalently,	on	every)	assignment.	The	product	logic	is	the	set	of	sentences	true	in	all	product	models.	
Perpetuity	is	true	in	a	product	model	⟨⟨W×T,	⟨α,	η⟩⟩,	⟦∙⟧⟩	just	in	case	T	=	{η},	since	when	W×{η}	is	assigned	to	𝑝,	□𝑝	is	true,	while	A𝑝	is	false	if	T	has	more	than	one	member.		This	is	also	the	condition	for	∀𝑝(𝑝	→	A𝑝)	(‘Every	true	proposition	is	always	true’)	to	be	true	in	a	product	model.		So,	as	advertised,	Perpetuity	turns	out	to	be	equivalent	to	propositional	eternalism	in	the	product	logic.11,	There	 are	 some	 additions	 to	 ℒ	 that	 look	 natural	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 product	models,	although	(as	we	shall	see)	their	interpretation	in	other	kinds	of	models	we	discuss	below	raises	difficult	philosophical	issues.		Most	straightforwardly,	we	can	add	operators	@	(‘actually’)	and	N	(‘now’),	with	the	following	semantic	clauses:		 ⟦@φ⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	:	⟨α,	𝑡⟩	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔}	⟦Nφ⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	:	⟨𝑤,	η⟩	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔}		In	 §IV	 and	 §V	 we	 consider	 arguments	 against	 Perpetuity	 formulated	 using	 these	operators.	We	could	also	enrich	ℒ	with	devices	 for	explicitly	 talking	about	worlds	and	times,	as	 follows.	We	add	countably	many	“world	variables”	𝑤𝑖,	and	“time	variables”	𝑡𝑖	have	assignment	functions	assign	a	member	of	W	to	each	world	variable	and	a	member	of	T	to	each	time	variable	and	have	∀𝑤𝑖	and	∀𝑡𝑖	vary	these	assignments	in	the	obvious	way.		We	can	then	add	new	predicates	‘Actualized’	and	‘Present’	that	take,	respectively,	a	world	variable	or	a	time	variable	as	arguments,	interpreted	as	follows:		 ⟦Actualized(𝑤𝑖)⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑔(𝑤𝑖),	𝑡⟩:	𝑡	∈	T}	
                                               11	Perpetuity	 and	 propositional	 eternalism	would	 still	 be	 equivalent	 if	 product	models	were	enriched	with	a	reflexive	accessibility	relation	R	on	W	and	the	clause	for	□	modified	accordingly.		More	generally	still,	we	can	relativize	R	to	members	of	T,	defining	⟦□φ⟧	as	{⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩:	⟨𝑤′,	𝑡⟩	∈	⟦φ⟧	for	all	𝑤′	such	that	𝑤R𝑡𝑤′}		(see	Thomasson	1984).		
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⟦Present(𝑡𝑖)⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑤,	𝑔(𝑡𝑖)⟩:	𝑤	∈	W}				Instead,	or	in	addition,	we	could	add	an	‘At’	operator	that	takes	a	world	or	time	variable	and	a	formula	as	arguments,	interpreted	as	follows:			 ⟦At	𝑤𝑖	φ⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩:	⟨𝑔(𝑤𝑖),	𝑡⟩	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔}	⟦At	𝑡𝑖	φ⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩:	⟨𝑤,	𝑔(𝑡𝑖)⟩	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔}				If	we	have	both	 ‘Present’	and	 ‘At’	 in	 the	 language,	 the	above	clauses	make	 ‘Present(𝑡𝑖)’	logically	equivalent	to	‘∀𝑝(𝑝	↔	At	𝑡𝑖	𝑝)’,	and	also	make	‘At	𝑡𝑖	φ’	logically	equivalent	to	both	‘A(Present(𝑡𝑖)	→	φ)’	and	‘S(Present(𝑡𝑖)	∧	φ)’;	similarly	for	‘Actualized’.		But	be	warned	that	such	 equivalences	 are	 not	 uncontroversial,	 since	 taken	 together	 they	 impose	 severe	constraints	on	the	extent	to	which	there	can	be	contingency	in	the	composition	of	the	time	series,	as	we	discuss	in	§IX.12		Adding	world-	 and	 time-quantifiers	makes	@	 and	N	 redundant	 in	 a	 certain	 sense:	every	sentence	φ	containing	N	is	logically	equivalent	to	∃𝑡(Present(𝑡)	∧	φ*),	where	𝑡	is	a	
                                               12 	An	 alternative	 to	 explicit	 quantification	 over	 times	 is	 to	 enrich	 the	 language	 with	devices	of	“temporal	anaphora”	(Kamp	1971,	Vlach	1973,	Cresswell	1990).		We	add	to	ℒ	countably	 many	 “time-storage”	 operators	 ↑0,	 ↑1,…	 and	 “then”	 operators	 ↓0,	 ↓1….	 	 	 To	interpret	them,	let	assignment	functions	assign	each	“then”	operator	a	member	of	T,	and	extend	the	interpretation	function	as	follows:	⟦↓𝑖φ⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩:	⟨𝑤,	𝑔(↓𝑖)⟩	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔}	⟦↑𝑖φ⟧𝑔={⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩:	⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔[↓𝑖↦𝑡]}		where	𝑔[↓𝑖↦𝑡]	is	an	assignment	like	𝑔	except	that	it	maps	↓𝑖	to	𝑡.	 	As	Cresswell	(1990)	points	out,	this	apparatus	is	expressively	equivalent	to	explicit	quantification	over	times,	assuming	time	variables	can	only	occur	as	arguments	of	‘At’	and	‘Present’.		Consider	the	translation	functions	*	and	†	defined	as	follows:		Present(𝑡𝑖)†	=	∀𝑝(𝑝	↔	↓𝑖𝑝)	 (↓𝑖φ)*	=	At	𝑡𝑖	φ*	 	(At	𝑡𝑖	φ)†	=	↓𝑖φ†	 (↑𝑖	φ)*	=	∃𝑡𝑖(Present(𝑡𝑖)	∧	φ*)	 	(∀𝑡𝑖	φ)†	=	↑𝑗A↑𝑖↓𝑗	φ†	(where	𝑗	is	a	new	index)	(*	and	†	commute	with	all	other	operators	and	quantifiers.)		For	any	formula	φ,	φ†	contains	no	time	variables	and	φ*	contains	no	time-storage	or	‘then’	operators.		It	is	easily	shown	that,	whenever	φ	is	a	closed	sentence	in	which	each	‘then’	operator	is	in	the	scope	of	the	corresponding	storage	operator,	φ	is	logically	equivalent	to	any	formula	obtained	from	φ	by	first	relabeling	its	time	variables	so	that	they	don’t	share	any	indices	with	any	time-storage	or	‘then’	operators	and	then	applying	either	*	or	†.			All	of	the	above	applies	mutatis	mutandis	to	quantification	over	worlds	(see	Correia	2007),	for	which	one	would	want	a	separate	set	of	“world-storage”	operators	⇑𝑖	and	“world-retrieval”	operators	⇓𝑖.	
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time-variable	that	doesn’t	occur	in	φ	and	φ*	is	the	result	of	substituting	‘At	𝑡’	for	every	occurrence	of	N	in	φ.		Similarly	for	@	and	‘At	𝑤’.	Moreover,	as	Fine	(1977)	shows,	the	addition	of	quantification	over	times	and	worlds	is	also	expressively	redundant	in	the	product	logic.		In	place	of	such	quantification,	we	can	quantify	 over	 ‘time-propositions’—intuitively,	 propositions	 equivalent	 to	 a	 particular	time’s	being	present—and	‘world-propositions’—intuitively,	propositions	equivalent	to	particular	world’s	being	actualized—where	these	notions	are	defined	as	follows:		 WorldProp(φ)	=df	◇A(φ	∧	∀𝑝(𝑝	→	□(φ	→	𝑝)))	TimeProp(φ)	=df	S□(φ	∧	∀𝑝(𝑝	→	A(φ	→	𝑝)))		The	upshot	of	these	definitions	is	that	⟦WorldProp(φ)⟧𝑔	=	W×T	if,	for	some	𝑤	∈	W,	⟦φ⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	:	𝑡	∈	T},	and	=	∅	otherwise;	likewise,	⟦TimeProp(φ)⟧𝑔	=	W×T	if,	for	some	𝑡	∈	T,	⟦φ⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑤,𝑡⟩	:	𝑤	∈	W},	and	=	∅	otherwise.		As	Fine	(1977:	167)	puts	it,	‘the	instant-propositions	and	the	world-propositions	are	the	temporal	and	modal	cross-sections,	respectively,	of	the	two-dimensional	 instant-world	manifold’.	 	To	eliminate	world	and	time	quantifiers	from	a	formula	without	free	world	or	time	variables,	we	proceed	as	follows:		First,	relabel	the	variables	 so	 that	no	 index	 is	 shared	between	variables	of	different	 types.	 	 Second,	eliminate	‘At’	in	favor	of	‘Present’	and	‘Actualized’	as	described	above.		Third,	replace	each	subformula	 of	 the	 form	 ∀𝑤𝑖(…)	with	 ∀𝑝𝑖(WorldProp(𝑝𝑖)	→	…),	 each	 subformula	 of	 the	form	∀𝑡𝑖(…)	with	∀𝑝𝑖(TimeProp(𝑝𝑖)	→	…),	and	each	subformula	of	the	form	Present(𝑡𝑖)	or	Actualized(𝑤𝑖)	with	𝑝𝑖.		It	is	straightforward	to	verify	that	the	resulting	formula	has	the	same	semantic	value	as	the	original	formula	on	every	assignment	in	every	model.		But	be	forewarned	that	these	equivalences	do	not	hold	in	any	of	the	other	classes	of	models	we	will	be	considering	below.		The	 fact	 the	 negation	 of	Perpetuity	 follows	 from	 propositional	 temporalism	 in	 the	product	logic	does	not	by	itself	constitute	anything	like	an	argument	against	Perpetuity	that	could	be	set	against	its	seemingly	obvious	truth.		Perhaps	model-theoretic	elegance	is	some	sort	of	guide	to	truth;	but	there	are	comparably	elegant	classes	of	models	which	validate	Perpetuity	without	validating	propositional	eternalism.		For	example,	Montague	
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(1973)	 uses	 what	 we	 will	 call	 ‘Montagovian	 models’—models	 also	 based	 on	 product	frames,	but	with	a	clause	for	□	equivalent	in	our	notation	to:			 ⟦□φ⟧𝑔	=	{⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	:	⟨𝑤′,	𝑡′⟩	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔	for	all	𝑤′	∈	W	and	𝑡′	∈	T}.			That	 is,	 ⟦□φ⟧𝑔	 =	W×T	 if	 ⟦φ⟧𝑔	 =	W×T	 and	 =	 ∅	 otherwise;	 so	 clearly,	 A𝑝	 is	 true	 on	 an	assignment	whenever	□𝑝	 is.	 In	 a	 footnote	 to	Montague’s	 clause,	 his	 editor	 Richmond	Thomason	writes	‘Here,	□	is	interpreted	in	the	sense	of	“necessarily	always”’	(Montague	1974:	259).	We	disagree:	Montague	explicitly	states	that	‘necessarily’	is	to	be	translated	as	‘□’,	and	the	natural	explanation	for	his	interpreting	□	in	the	above	way	is	a	desire	to	respect	Perpetuity.	 	The	additions	to	ℒ	discussed	above	can	be	interpreted	in	Montagovian	models	in	the	same	way	as	 in	product	models.	 	These	 interpretations	are	 completely	natural	 for	 the	temporal	 additions	 (N,	 ∀𝑡,	 ‘Present’,	 and	 ‘At	𝑡’).	 	 They	 are	 less	 natural	 for	 the	 modal	additions	(@,	∀𝑤,	‘Actualized’	and	‘At	𝑤’),	since	for	example	we	will	lose	the	equivalence	of	□𝑝	and	∀𝑤	At	𝑤	𝑝.	 	 (In	§V	and	§VI	we	will	discuss	some	other	ways	of	 interpreting	possible-worlds	 talk.)	 	 Note	 too	 that	 Fine’s	 reduction	 of	 the	 expanded	 language	 to	 ℒ	behaves	pathologically	in	Montagovian	models:	∃𝑝(TimeProp(𝑝))	and	∃𝑝(WorldProp(𝑝))	are	both	 false	 in	any	Montagovian	model	where	T	has	more	 than	one	member.	 	More	generally,	 when	 N,	 or	 ∀𝑡	 and	 ‘Present’,	 or	 ∀𝑡	 and	 ‘At	𝑡’,	 or	 @,	 or	 ∀𝑤	 and	 ‘At	𝑤’	 are	interpreted	in	Montagovian	models	in	the	ways	described	above,	some	formulae	without	free	 time	 or	 world	 variables	 are	 not	 equivalent	 to	 any	 ℒ-formula. 13 	This	 suggests	 a	
                                               13 	When	 𝑓	:	W	→	TT	 maps	 each	 member	 of	 W	 to	 a	 permutation	 of	 T,	 define	𝑓*	:	P(W×T)	→	P(W×T)	by	𝑓*(X)	=	{⟨𝑤,	𝑓(𝑤)(𝑡)⟩	:	⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	∈	X}.	A	straightforward	induction	shows	that	for	any	ℒ-formula	φ	and	assignment	𝑔,	⟦φ⟧𝑓*∘𝑔	=	𝑓*(⟦φ⟧𝑔).		But	this	is	not	true	for	any	of	the	listed	expansions	of	ℒ.		For	example,	consider	the	Montagovian	model	where	W	 =	 T	 =	 {0,1}	 and	 α=η=0.	 	 For	 each	 𝑥	∈	{0,1},	 let	 𝑓(0)(𝑥)=𝑥	 and	 𝑓(1)(𝑥)=1–𝑥.	 	 Let	𝑔(𝑝)	=	{⟨0,0⟩,	⟨1,0⟩}	 so	𝑓*∘𝑔(𝑝)	=	{⟨0,0⟩,	⟨1,1⟩}.	 	 Then	 ⟦N𝑝⟧𝑔	=	W×T,	 so	 ⟦□N𝑝⟧𝑔	=	W×T	 =	𝑓*(W×T)	 =	 𝑓*(⟦□N𝑝⟧),	 but	⟦N𝑝⟧𝑓*∘𝑔	=	{⟨0,0⟩,	⟨0,1⟩},	 so	 ⟦□N𝑝⟧𝑓*∘𝑔	=	∅	≠	𝑓*(⟦□N𝑝⟧).		Similarly	 for	 ∃𝑡(Present(𝑡)	∧	□A(Present(𝑡)	→	𝑝),	 ∃𝑡(∀𝑞(𝑞	↔	At	 𝑡	 𝑞)	∧	□At	 𝑡	 𝑝),	□(𝑝	↔	@𝑝),	and	∃𝑤(∀𝑞(𝑞	↔	At	𝑤	𝑞)	∧	□(𝑝	↔	At	𝑤	𝑞)).		By	contrast,	if	we	just	add	world-quantifiers	and	‘Actualized’,	with	the	obvious	interpretations,	every	world-variable	free	formula	is	equivalent	to	an	ℒ-formula,	namely	one	derived	from	it	by	eliminating	index-sharing,	 replacing	 Actualized(𝑤𝑖)	 with	 pi,	 and	 replacing	 ∀𝑤𝑖(…)	 with	∀𝑝𝑖(WorldProp*(𝑝𝑖)	→	…),	where	WorldProp*(φ)	=df	◇(Aφ	∧	∀𝑞(A𝑞	→	□(φ	→	𝑞))).			
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broader	lesson:	for	proponents	of	Perpetuity,	quantification	over	times	provides	a	kind	of	co-ordination	between	different	possible	world-histories	that	cannot	be	expressed	using	only	standard	modal	and	temporal	operators.		It	is	open	to	them	to	think	that	sentences	that	 ineliminably	 involve	 these	 additional	 resources	 are	 problematic	 in	 a	way	 that	ℒ-sentences	are	not;	 for	example,	perhaps	 time-quantification	gives	rise	 to	vagueness	or	indeterminacy,	in	a	way	that	temporal	operators	do	not,	when	quantifying	into	the	scope	of	modal	operators.	
III. 		
In	this	section	we	will	define	a	more	general	class	of	models	whose	logic	we	will	treat	as	uncontroversial	 in	what	 follows.	 Exploring	 the	 connection	 between	 these	models	 and	product	models	leads	us	to	a	principle	—	Symmetry	—	which	is	valid	in	the	product	logic	and	 whose	 conjunction	 with	 propositional	 temporalism	 uncontroversially	 implies	 the	falsity	 of	Perpetuity.	 Isolating	 this	 principle	 thereby	 allows	 us	 to	 prescind	 from	model	theoretic	 considerations	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 paper,	 considering	 instead	 the	 comparative	merits	of	Symmetry	and	Perpetuity.		A	relational	structure	is	a	quadruple	𝒮	=	⟨I,	≈□,	≈A,	ι⟩,	where	≈□	(the	‘modal	accessibility	relation’)	and	≈A	(the	‘temporal	accessibility	relation’)	are	each	equivalence	relations	on	I,	and	ι	(the	‘home	point’)	is	a	member	of	I.		Given	a	relational	structure	⟨I,	≈□,	≈A,	ι⟩	and	an	assignment	 function	𝑔	 mapping	 propositional	 variables	 to	 subsets	 of	 I,	 we	 define	 the	interpretation	function	⟦∙⟧𝑔	from	formulae	of	ℒ	to	subsets	of	I	as	follows:		 ⟦𝑝𝑖⟧𝑔	=	𝑔(𝑝𝑖)	⟦¬φ⟧𝑔	=	I	–	⟦φ⟧𝑔	⟦φ	∧	ψ⟧𝑔	=	⟦φ⟧𝑔	∩	⟦ψ⟧𝑔	⟦□φ⟧𝑔	=	{𝑥	∈	I	:	𝑦	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔	for	all	𝑦	such	that	𝑥	≈□	𝑦}	⟦Aφ⟧𝑔	=	{𝑥	∈	I	:	𝑦	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔	for	all	𝑦	such	that	𝑥	≈A	𝑦}	⟦∀piφ⟧𝑔	=	{𝑗	∈	I	:	𝑗	∈	⟦φ⟧ℎ	for	all	ℎ	that	agree	with	𝑔	on	variables	other	than	𝑝𝑖}		
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φ	is	true	on	an	assignment	𝑔	in	⟨I,	≈□,	≈A,	ι⟩	if	and	only	if	ι	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔;	a	closed	sentence	is	true	in	a	relational	structure	if	and	only	if	it	is	true	on	some	assignment;	the	background	logic	is	the	set	of	all	sentences	true	in	every	relational	structure.		 We	will	now	consider	some	important	subclasses	of	relational	structures.	(i) Let	a	connected	relational	structure	be	one	in	which	every	point	in	I	can	be	reached	from	ι	by	some	finite	sequence	of	points,	each	bearing		≈□	or		≈A	to	its	predecessor.	Clearly	 the	 same	 sentences	 are	 true	 in	 a	 relational	 structure	 as	 are	 true	 in	 the	connected	relational	structure	derived	from	it	by	throwing	away	all	the	points	not	reachable	from	ι	by	such	a	finite	sequence;	thus	the	background	logic	is	also	the	logic	of	the	class	of	connected	relational	structures.		(ii) Let	 a	product	 structure	 be	 a	 relational	 structure	 of	 the	 form	 ⟨W×T,	=2,	 =1,	 ⟨α,	η⟩⟩,	where	α	∈	W,	η	∈	T,	⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	=1	⟨𝑤′,	𝑡′⟩	 if	and	only	 if	𝑤=𝑤′,	and	⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	=2	⟨𝑤′,	𝑡′⟩	 if	and	only	 if	 𝑡=𝑡′. 14 		 A	 product	 structure	 has	 the	 same	 interpretation	 function	 as	 the	product	model	based	on	⟨W×T,	⟨α,	η⟩⟩.		So	the	background	logic	is	contained	in	the	product	logic.	(iii) Let	 a	 Montagovian	 structure	 be	 a	 relational	 structure	 of	 the	 form	 ⟨W×T,	(W×T)×(W×T),	=1,	⟨α,	η⟩⟩—i.e.	the	same	as	a	product	structure	but	with	a	universal	modal	accessibility	relation.		A	Montagovian	structure	has	the	same	interpretation	function	as	the	Montagovian	model	based	on	the	product	frame	⟨W×T,	⟨α	,η⟩⟩.		So	the	background	logic	is	contained	in	the	logic	of	Montagovian	models.		(iv) Let	 a	 generalized	 product	 structure	 be	 a	 relational	 structure	 of	 the	 form	⟨D,	=2,	=1,	⟨α,	η⟩⟩,	where	D	is	some	set	of	ordered	pairs	and	⟨α,	η⟩	∈	D.15	(v) Let	 a	 generalized	 Montagovian	 structure	 be	 one	 of	 the	 form	 ⟨D,	D×D,	=1,	⟨α,	η⟩⟩,	where	D	is	some	set	of	ordered	pairs	and	⟨α,	η⟩	∈	D.	
                                               14	A	product	structure	⟨W×T,	=2,	=1,	⟨α,	η⟩⟩	is	in	a	natural	sense	the	product	of	the	pointed	Kripke	structures		⟨W,	UW,	α⟩	and	⟨T,	UT,	η⟩,	where	UW	and	UT	are	the	universal	accessibility	relations	on	W	and	T:	see	Kurucz	2007	15 	The	 interpretation	 function	 on	 generalized	 product	 structures	 can	 be	 naturally	extended	 to	 interpret	 sentences	 containing	 ‘Present’,	 ‘Actualized’,	 ‘∀t’,	 and	 ‘∀w’	 in	 the	same	 way	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 product	models.	 	 By	 contrast,	 there	 are	 several	 different	possible	ways	of	interpreting	N,	@,	At	𝑡,	and	At	𝑤	in	such	structures,	for	reasons	that	will	emerge	in	§IX.		
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	 Every	relational	structure	with	a	universal	modal	accessibility	relation	is	isomorphic	to	 a	 generalized	 Montagovian	 structure.	 (The	 function	 mapping	 each	 point	 𝑥	 to	 the	ordered	 pair	 ⟨[𝑥]≈A,	𝑥⟩,	 where	 [𝑥]≈A	 is	 the	 ≈A-equivalence	 class	 containing	 𝑥,	 is	 an	isomorphism	between	the	original	structure	and	the	generalized	Montagovian	structure	whose	set	of	points	is	the	image	of	that	function.)		And	every	relational	structure	with	a	universal	modal	accessibility	relation	in	which	all	the	equivalence	classes	under	≈A	are	equinumerous	 is	 isomorphic	 to	 a	 Montagovian	 structure.	 (Choose	 an	 arbitrary	equivalence	relation	≈?	such	that,	for	all	𝑥	and	𝑦	there	is	a	unique	𝑦′	in	[𝑦]≈A	such	that	𝑥	≈?	𝑦′,	and	then	consider	the	function	mapping	each	point	𝑥	to	the	ordered	pair	⟨[𝑥]≈A,	[𝑥]≈?⟩.)	We	can	similarly	give	intrinsic	characterizations,	up	to	isomorphism,	of	generalized	product	structures	and	product	structures.		Say	that	a	point	𝑥	in	a	relational	structure	is	
unaccompanied	 if	 𝑥	 is	 the	 only	 point	 both	modally	 and	 temporally	 accessible	 from	 𝑥.		Clearly,	 every	 point	 in	 a	 generalized	 product	 structure	 is	 unaccompanied.	 	Moreover,	every	 relational	 structure	 in	 which	 every	 point	 is	 unaccompanied	 is	 isomorphic	 to	 a	generalized	product	structure.		Given	any	relational	structure	𝒮	=	⟨I,	≈□,	≈A,	ι⟩,	let	W𝒮	=	I∕≈□	(the	 set	 of	 equivalence	 classes	 of	 I	 under	 ≈□),	 T𝒮	 =	 I∕≈A,	 α𝒮	 =	 [ι]≈□	 (the	member	 of	 I∕≈□	containing	 ι),	 and	 η𝒮	 =	 [ι]≈A.	 	 Define	 f𝒮	:	 I	→	W𝒮×T𝒮	 by	 f𝒮(𝑗)	=	 ⟨[𝑗]≈□,	[𝑗]≈A⟩,	 and	 let	D𝒮	 =	{f𝒮(𝑗)	:	𝑗	∈	I}.		If	every	point	in	𝒮	is	unaccompanied,	f𝒮	is	one-to-one.		Moreover	𝑥	≈□	𝑦	if	and	only	 if	 f𝒮(𝑥)	 =2	 f𝒮(𝑦),	 𝑥	≈A	𝑦	 if	 and	 only	 if	 f𝒮(𝑥)	 =1	 f𝒮(𝑦),	 and	 f𝒮(ι)	 =	 ⟨α𝒮,	η𝒮⟩,	 so	 f𝒮	 is	 an	isomorphism	from	𝒮	to	the	generalized	product	structure	⟨D𝒮,	=2,	=1,	⟨α𝒮,	η𝒮⟩⟩.			Turning	to	product	structures:	say	that	a	point	𝑥	 in	a	relational	structure	is	square-
completing	just	in	case	whenever	𝑥	≈□	𝑦1	and	𝑥	≈A	𝑦2,	there	is	some	𝑧	such	that	𝑦1	≈A	𝑧	and	𝑦2	≈□	𝑧.	 	 Every	 point	 in	 a	 product	 structure	 is	 square-completing	 (as	 well	 as	unaccompanied).		Moreover,	every	connected	relational	structure	in	which	every	point	is	both	unaccompanied	and	square-completing	is	isomorphic	to	a	product	structure.			This	follows	 from	 the	 fact	 that	whenever	𝑥	 and	𝑦	 are	 two	points	 in	 a	 connected	 relational	structure	𝒮	where	every	point	is	square-completing,	there	is	a	point	modally	accessible	
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from	𝑦	and	temporally	accessible	from	𝑥.16		Hence	every	member	of	W𝒮	overlaps	every	member	of	T𝒮,	so	that	D𝒮	(the	image	of	the	function	𝑓𝒮	defined	above)	is	the	full	Cartesian	product	W𝒮×T𝒮.	The	two	properties	of	points	we	have	just	isolated	correspond	to	the	following	pair	of	sentences	of	ℒ:		
Symmetry:	Every	falsehood	necessitates	something	that	is	never	true	when	it	is.	∀𝑝(¬𝑝	→	∃𝑞(□(𝑝	→	𝑞)	∧	A(𝑝	→	¬𝑞)))	
Church-Rosser:	Whatever	could	always	be	true	always	could	be	true.	∀𝑝(◇A𝑝	→	A◇𝑝)		In	 any	 relational	 structure,	 the	 unaccompanied	 points	 are	 all	 and	 only	 those	 where	
Symmetry	is	true,	and	the	square-completing	points	are	all	and	only	those	where	Church-
Rosser	are	true.17	(Proofs:	 (i)	 Suppose	Symmetry	 is	 true	 at	𝑥,	𝑦	≈□	𝑥,	 and	𝑦	≈A	𝑥.	 	 Let	𝑔(𝑝)={𝑦}.	 	 Then	𝑥	∉	⟦∃𝑞(□(𝑝	→	𝑞)	∧	A(𝑝	→	¬𝑞))⟧𝑔,	 since	 for	 any	 𝑞-variant	 𝑔′	 of	 𝑔,	 𝑥	∉	⟦□(𝑝	→	𝑞)⟧𝑔′	 if	𝑦	∉	𝑔′(𝑞)	while	𝑥	∉	⟦A(𝑝	→	¬𝑞)⟧𝑔′	 if	𝑦	∈	𝑔′(𝑞).	 	Since	Symmetry	 is	true	at	𝑥,	𝑥	∉	⟦¬𝑝⟧𝑔,	so	𝑥	∈	𝑔(𝑝),	 so	 𝑥	=	𝑦.	 	 Hence	 𝑥	 is	 unaccompanied.	 	 (ii)	 Suppose	 𝑥	 is	 unaccompanied	 and	𝑥	∉	𝑔(𝑝).		Let	𝑔′	be	the	𝑞-variant	of	𝑔	that	assigns	to	𝑞	the	set	of	all	points	that	are	either	modally	accessible	from	𝑥	and	in	𝑔(𝑝),	or	temporally	accessible	from	𝑥	and	not	in	𝑔(𝑝).		Clearly	𝑥	∈	⟦□(𝑝	→	𝑞)⟧𝑔′.	 	Also	𝑥	∈	⟦A(𝑝	→	¬𝑞)⟧𝑔′,	since	the	only	points	in	both	𝑔′(𝑝)	and	
                                               16 	Proof:	 we	 first	 show	 that	 in	 a	 relational	 structure	 where	 every	 point	 is	 square-completing,	whenever	𝑦	is	reachable	from	𝑥	in	three	steps	it	is	also	reachable	from	𝑥	in	two	steps.		Suppose	𝑥	≈□	𝑧1,	𝑧1	≈A	𝑧2,	and	𝑧2	≈□	𝑦.	 	Since	𝑧2	is	square-completing,	there	is	some	point	𝑧3	such	that	𝑧1	≈□	𝑧3	and	𝑧3	≈A	𝑦;	then	by	the	transitivity	of	≈□,	𝑥	≈□	𝑧3,	so	𝑦	is	just	two	steps	from	𝑥.		(Similarly	when	the	initial	sequence	contains	two	temporal	and	one	modal	step.)	We	can	then	show	by	induction	that	whenever	𝑦	is	reachable	from	𝑥	in	any	finite	number	of	steps	it	is	reachable	in	two	steps.		If	the	structure	is	connected,	this	means	that	any	two	points	are	 just	 two	steps	apart—and	given	that	 the	 intermediate	point	 is	square-completing,	the	steps	can	be	taken	in	either	order.		17	Notice	that	both	Symmetry	and	Church-Rosser	are	symmetric	with	respect	to	modality	and	tense	in	the	sense	that	they	are	equivalent	(in	the	background	logic)	to	their	“mirror	images”,	i.e.	the	results	of	interchanging	□	and	A	in	them.		The	mirror-image	of	Symmetry,	∀𝑝(¬𝑝	→	∃𝑞(A(𝑝	→	𝑞)	∧	□(𝑝	→	¬𝑞))),	 is	witnessed	 for	 a	 given	𝑝	 by	 the	 negation	 of	 any	proposition	𝑞	 that	witnesses	Symmetry	 for	 that	𝑝.	 	The	mirror-image	of	Church-Rosser,	∀𝑝(S□𝑝	→	□S𝑝),	is	equivalent	to	∀𝑝(¬A◇¬𝑝	→	¬◇A¬𝑝)	and	hence	to	∀𝑝(◇A¬𝑝	→	A◇¬𝑝),	which	is	equivalent	to	Church-Rosser	by	quantificational	logic.			
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𝑔′(𝑞)	are	modally	accessible,	but	also	distinct,	from	𝑥,	and	hence	not	temporally	accessible	from	𝑥.		So	𝑥	∈	⟦∃𝑞(□(𝑝	→	𝑞)	∧	A(𝑝	→	¬𝑞)⟧𝑔,	and	thus	Symmetry	is	true	at	𝑥.		(iii)	Suppose	
Church-Rosser	 is	 true	 at	 𝑥,	 𝑦1	≈□	𝑥,	 and	 𝑦2	≈A	𝑥.	 	 Let	 𝑔(𝑝)	=	[𝑦1]≈A.	 	 Since	 𝑦1	∈	⟦A𝑝⟧𝑔,	𝑥	∈	⟦◇A𝑝⟧𝑔,	so	by	Church-Rosser,	𝑥	∈	⟦A◇𝑝⟧𝑔,	and	thus	𝑦2	∈	⟦◇𝑝⟧𝑔.		Hence	there	is	some	𝑧	modally	accessible	from	𝑦2	that	belongs	to	𝑔(𝑝),	and	so	is	temporally	accessible	from	𝑦1:	thus	𝑥	is	square-completing.		(iv)	Suppose	𝑥	is	square-completing	and	𝑥	∈	⟦◇A𝑝⟧𝑔.		Then	there	is	a	point	𝑦1	modally	accessible	from	𝑥	such	that	every	point	temporally	accessible	from	 𝑦1	 is	 in	𝑔(𝑝).	 Consider	 any	 𝑦2	 temporally	 accessible	 from	 𝑥.	 Since	 𝑥	 is	 square-completing,	there	is	a	point	𝑧	that	is	both	temporally	accessible	from	𝑦1	(so	𝑧	∈	𝑔(𝑝))	and	modally	accessible	from	𝑦2	(so	𝑦2	∈	⟦◇𝑝⟧𝑔).	Since	this	holds	for	all	such	𝑦2,	𝑥	∈	⟦A◇𝑝⟧𝑔;	hence	Church-Rosser	is	true	at	𝑥.)	It	 follows	 immediately	 from	this	result	 that	every	connected	relational	structure	 in	which	all	the	sentences	that	result	from	prefixing	any	sequence	of	□s	and	As	to	Symmetry	or	Church-Rosser	 are	 true	 is	 one	 in	which	 every	 point	 is	 unaccompanied	 and	 square-completing,	and	hence	isomorphic	to	a	product	structure.		As	it	turns	out,	three	of	these	sentences,	namely	□A(Symmetry),	□(Church-Rosser),	and	A(Church-Rosser),	suffice	in	the	background	logic	to	imply	all	the	rest—and	thus,	to	imply	the	entire	product	logic.18,	19	
Perpetuity	 is	 true	 in	 a	 relational	 structure	 just	 in	 case	 every	 point	 temporally	accessible	from	ι	is	also	modally	accessible	from	ι.		Propositional	eternalism,	meanwhile,	
                                               18 	Proof:	 From	 □(Church-Rosser)	 we	 get	 ∀𝑝□(◇A𝑝	 →	 A◇𝑝)	 (by	 the	 Converse	 Barcan	Formula),	 hence	 ∀𝑝□(◇A□𝑝	→	A◇□𝑝)	 by	 quantificational	 reasoning,	 hence	∀𝑝(□◇A□𝑝	→	□A◇□𝑝)	by	the	modal	K	schema,	hence	∀𝑝(A□𝑝	→	□A𝑝)	by	the	modal	B	schema.	 	 Similarly,	 A(Church-Rosser)	 implies	 ∀𝑝(□A𝑝	→	A□𝑝).	 	 The	 two	 together	 thus	yield	 the	 commutativity	 principle	 ∀𝑝(□A𝑝	 ↔	 A□𝑝),	 which	 by	 an	 induction	 using	 the	temporal	and	modal	4	schemas	implies	∀𝑝(□A𝑝	→	O1…O𝑛p)	for	any	string	O1…On	of	As	and	□s.	 	 In	 particular	 we	 have	 □A(Symmetry)	 →	 O1…O𝑛(Symmetry).	 	 The	 combination	 of	commutativity	 with	 A(Church-Rosser)	 also	 implies	 □A(Church-Rosser),	 and	 hence	O1…O𝑛(Church-Rosser)	for	any	O1…O𝑛.		For	consider	any	proposition	𝑝.		If	A◇𝑝	is	false	then	A¬A◇𝑝,	so	A¬◇A𝑝	by	A(Church-Rosser),	so	A□¬◇A𝑝,	so	□A¬◇A𝑝	by	commutativity,	so	□A(◇A𝑝	→	A◇𝑝).	 	 If	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 A◇𝑝	 is	 true,	 we	 have	 A□◇𝑝,	 so	 □A◇𝑝	 by	commutativity,	so	□AA◇𝑝,	so	again	□A(◇A𝑝	→	A◇𝑝).	19 	Fritz	 (forthcoming)	 proves	 that	 the	 product	 logic	 (his	 ΛPU)	 is	 not	 recursively	axiomatizable;	given	its	axiomatizability	relative	to	the	background	logic,	it	follows	that	the	 background	 logic	 (Fritz’s	 ΛPF)	 is	 also	 not	 recursively	 axiomatizable,	 a	 fact	 already	proved	by	Antonelli	and	Thomasson	(2002).			
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is	true	just	in	case	no	point	other	than	ι	is	temporally	accessible	from	ι.		These	conditions	will	coincide	in	any	relational	structure	whose	home	point	is	unaccompanied,	i.e.	in	any	relational	 structure	 in	 which	 Symmetry	 is	 true.	 	 This	 fact	 makes	 Symmetry	 a	 natural	principle	to	focus	on,	since	it	seems	to	at	least	partially	articulate	the	idea	that	time	and	modality	interact	in	a	symmetric	way,	it	is	valid	in	the	product	logic,	and	in	the	background	logic	it	implies	the	collapse	of	Perpetuity	to	propositional	eternalism.			In	fact	very	little	of	the	background	logic	is	needed	to	establish	this	implication,	as	we	can	see	from	the	following	direct	argument.	Suppose	Symmetry	and	Perpetuity	are	both	true.		Let	𝑝	be	any	falsehood.		By	Perpetuity,	∀𝑞(□(𝑝	→	𝑞)	→	A(𝑝	→	𝑞)),	while	by	Symmetry,	∃𝑞(□(𝑝	→	𝑞)	∧	A(𝑝	→	¬𝑞)).	 	 Combining	 these	 two	 formulae	 using	 standard	 quantifier	reasoning,	 we	 have	 ∃𝑞(A(𝑝	→	𝑞)	∧	A(𝑝	→	¬𝑞))).	 Given	 the	 agglomeration	 of	 A	 over	conjunction,	 this	 implies	 ∃𝑞(A((𝑝	→	𝑞)	∧	(𝑝	→	¬𝑞))),	 which	 is	 equivalent	 to	 ∃𝑞A¬𝑝	 by	substitution	of	tautological	equivalents.		But	∃𝑞A¬𝑝	obviously	entails	A¬𝑝.		Generalizing,	we	have	∀𝑝(¬𝑝	→	A¬𝑝),	which	is	equivalent	to	propositional	eternalism.	
Symmetry	 is	not	the	easiest	principle	to	think	about.	 	Fortunately,	it	is	equivalent	in	the	background	logic	to	the	following	structurally	more	familiar	principle:		
Supervenience:	Every	truth	is	necessitated	by	a	permanent	truth.			 ∀𝑝(𝑝	→	∃𝑞(□(𝑞	→	𝑝)	∧	A𝑞))		(Proof:	∃𝑞(□(𝑞	→	𝑝)	∧	A𝑞)	is	logically	equivalent	to	∃𝑞(□(𝑞	→	𝑝)	∧	A(¬𝑞	→	𝑝)),	since	any	𝑞	that	 witnesses	 the	 former	 witnesses	 the	 latter,	 while	 if	 𝑞	 witnesses	 the	 latter,	 𝑝∨𝑞	witnesses	 the	 former.	 	 Supervenience	 is	 therefore	 equivalent	 to	∀𝑝(𝑝	→	∃𝑞(□(𝑞	→	𝑝)	∧	A(¬𝑞	→	𝑝)));	substituting	¬𝑝	 for	𝑝	and	¬𝑞	 for	𝑞	and	contraposing	the	conditionals	yields	Symmetry.)			
Supervenience	doesn’t	wear	its	symmetry	on	its	sleeve	in	the	way	that	Symmetry	does.		Nevertheless,	 since	 Supervenience	 is	 equivalent	 to	 something	 equivalent	 to	 its	 mirror	image	(namely	Symmetry),	and	the	mirror	image	of	anything	valid	in	the	background	logic	is	also	valid	in	the	background	logic,	Supervenience	is	equivalent	in	the	background	logic	to	its	mirror	image:			
 16	
Supervenience*:	For	every	truth,	there	is	a	necessary	truth	that	is	never	true	without	it	being	true.		 ∀𝑝(𝑝	→	∃𝑞(A(𝑞	→	𝑝)	∧	□𝑞))				This	equivalence	helps	to	bring	out	how	Symmetry	goes	beyond	the	mere	denial	of	the	combination	 of	 Perpetuity	 with	 propositional	 temporalism:	 not	 only	 are	 there	 are	temporary	 necessary	 truths,	 there	 are	 necessary	 truths	 of	 arbitrarily	 short	 temporal	extent.	But	why	would	anyone	believe	these	principles?	 	 In	 the	next	 four	sections,	we	will	consider	some	possible	arguments.	
IV. 	
Perhaps	 the	 most	 straightforward	 argument	 for	 Symmetry	 turns	 on	 the	 following	principle:			 NOW	 Every	proposition	is,	necessarily,	true	just	in	case	it	is	now	true.	∀𝑝□(𝑝	↔	N𝑝)					
Supervenience,	 and	 hence	 Symmetry,	 follows	 from	 NOW	 together	 with	 the	 following	relatively	uncontroversial	additional	premise:			 RIGN	 Everything	true	now	is	always	true	now.	∀𝑝(N𝑝	→	AN𝑝)		For	suppose	that	𝑝	is	true.	Then	by	NOW,	the	proposition	that	𝑝	is	now	true	is	true;	by			RIGN	 it	 is	 a	 permanent	 truth,	 and	 by	 NOW	 it	 necessitates	 𝑝.	 	 Thus	 every	 truth	 is	necessitated	by	a	permanent	truth.	Given	 NOW,	 RIGN,	 and	 propositional	 temporalism,	 we	 can	 generate	 specific	counterexamples	to	Perpetuity.		Suppose	𝑝	is	temporarily	true.		Then	the	proposition	that	𝑝	is	true	if	and	only	if	𝑝	is	now	true	is	also	temporarily	true,	since	it	is	true	exactly	when	𝑝	
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is	 true.	 	 But	 by	 NOW,	 this	 biconditional	 is	 necessarily	 true,	 and	 is	 therefore	 a	counterexample	to	Perpetuity.20			Those	who	accept	NOW	will	not	think	that	the	proposition	it	expresses	is	always	true.		Rather,	the	interesting,	non-arbitrary	view	in	the	vicinity	is	that	the	modal	status	which	NOW	attributes	to	the	present	time	is	one	which,	necessarily,	every	time	has	at	itself.		We	can	express	this	more	general	idea	using	quantification	over	times,	as	follows:		 NOW+	Necessarily,	at	each	time	𝑡,	every	proposition	is,	necessarily,	true	just	in	case	it	is	true	at	𝑡.	□∀𝑡	At	𝑡	∀𝑝□(𝑝	↔	At	𝑡	𝑝)21				As	Fine	(1977:	169)	puts	it:	‘At	each	time,	the	same	present	runs	through	each	possible	world’.	The	necessary	permanent	truth	of	Supervenience	is	an	immediate	consequence	of	NOW+:	necessarily,	at	any	time	𝑡,	for	any	true	proposition	𝑝,	the	proposition	that	𝑝	is	true	at	𝑡	is	a	permanent	truth	that	necessitates	𝑝.22		As	defenders	of	Perpetuity,	we	of	 course	 think	 there	are	 counterexamples	 to	NOW.		Consider	the	proposition	that	dinosaurs	roam	the	Earth.		It	is	not	true,	so	it	has	never	been	
now	true.		But	it	has	been	true,	so	it	has	been	true	without	being	now	true.		So	by	Perpetuity	it	must	 be	 possible	 for	 it	 to	 be	 true	without	 being	 now	 true.	 	With	 such	 propositions	squarely	in	view,	we	find	that	Perpetuity	remains	compelling,	and	the	plausibility	of	NOW	correspondingly	 diminishes.	 	 Without	 some	 further	 argument,	 then,	 rejecting	 NOW	doesn’t	 strike	 us	 as	particularly	 costly.	 	But	 there	 are	 some	 interesting	 arguments	 for	NOW.		We	will	consider	two	of	them.			
                                               20	NOW	is	valid	on	the	logic	of	product	models	extended	to	interpret	the	N	operator	in	the	manner	described	in	§II,	but	not	on	the	logic	of	Montagovian	models	extended	in	the	same	way.		RIGN	is	valid	on	both	classes	of	models.	21	NOW+	is	also	valid	on	the	class	of	product	models	enriched	to	interpret	quantification	over	times.	If	you	are	a	fan	of	the	approach	to	temporal	anaphora	discussed	in	footnote	12,	then,	for	your	eyes	only,	we	can	reformulate	NOW+	as	follows:	□A↑1∀𝑝□(𝑝	↔	↓1𝑝).	22	By	contrast,	there	is	no	straightforward	derivation	of	NOW+	from	Supervenience.		We	can	 see	 this	 fact	 model-theoretically,	 by	 considering	 a	 generalization	 of	 product	structures	in	which	the	modal	accessibility	relation	need	not	be	=2	(sharing	the	same	time	co-ordinate),	 but	 can	 be	 any	 equivalence	 relation	 each	 of	 whose	 equivalence	 classes	contains	 exactly	 one	 point	 with	 each	 world	 co-ordinate.	 	 Symmetry	 (and	 hence	
Supervenience)	is	still	valid	on	this	class	of	structures,	but	NOW	and	NOW+	no	longer	are.	
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First:	NOW	can	be	derived	from	the	following	claims:	(a)	‘necessarily’	commutes	with	‘now’	 (i.e.	 the	 propositions	 that	 are	 now	 necessarily	 true	 are	 exactly	 those	 that	 are	necessarily	now	true);	(b)	every	proposition	is	necessarily	now:	true	if	and	only	if	now	true;	and	(c)	every	proposition	that	is	now	true	is	true.		Given	(a),	(b)	implies	that	every	proposition	is	now	necessarily:	true	if	and	only	if	now	true.		And	given	(c),	we	can	delete	the	initial	‘now’	from	this	claim	to	derive	NOW.			We	see	no	convincing	grounds	to	accept	(a),	on	its	intended	interpretation	as	a	claim	about	metaphysical	necessity.23		While	‘necessarily	now	φ’	and	‘now	necessarily	φ’	may	be	interchangeable	in	typical	contexts,	it	is	also	clear	that	in	typical	contexts,	prefixing	a	context-sensitive	 sentence	 with	 ‘now’	 will	 lead	 us	 to	 favor	 resolutions	 of	 its	 context-sensitivity	on	which	it	expresses	a	non-eternal	proposition—otherwise,	the	‘now’	would	be	pointless.		But	given	Perpetuity	and	modal	S5,	all	attributions	of	metaphysical	necessity	are	 eternal:	 if	 true	 they	 are	 necessarily	 true,	 and	 hence	 always	 true;	 if	 false	 they	 are	necessarily	false,	and	hence	always	false.		So	in	typical	contexts	it	will	not	be	natural	to	interpret	 the	 ‘necessarily’	 in	 ‘now	necessarily	φ’	 as	expressing	metaphysical	necessity.		For	 this	 reason,	 one	 should	 be	 wary	 of	 drawing	 any	 conclusions	 about	 metaphysical	necessity	from	our	intuitive	reactions	to	the	schema	‘Necessarily	now	φ	just	in	case	now	necessarily	φ’.24	Second:	NOW	can	be	derived	from	certain	premises	about	counterfactuals:	(i)	Every	proposition	would	have	been	true	now	if	it	had	been	true;	(ii)	No	possibly	true	proposition	is	such	that	a	contradiction	would	have	been	true	if	it	had	been	true;	(iii)	‘Now’	commutes	with	 truth-functional	 connectives	 (even	 under	 counterfactual	 suppositions);	 (iv)	 ‘Now	now’	is	intersubstitutable	with	‘now’	(even	under	counterfactual	suppositions).		(Proof:	
                                               23	We	also	have	doubts	about	(b)	which	will	emerge	in	§IX.			24 	It	 would	 be	 a	 bit	 uncomfortable	 for	 us	 if,	 outside	 of	 special	 contexts	 like	 that	 of	philosophy,	modals	in	ordinary	language	always	commuted	with	‘now’:	one	might	then	worry	that	metaphysical	necessity	as	we	conceive	 it	does	not	really	count	as	a	kind	of	necessity	at	all.		But	there	are	cases	where	ordinary	modals	seem	not	to	commute	with	‘now’.		Consider	for	example	the	use	of	‘might’	on	which	it	concerns	the	epistemic	state	of	some	salient	person	other	than	the	speaker.		If	the	salient	person	is	not	sure	of	the	time,	we	can	say	things	like	‘Although	she	knows	that	it	is	raining,	it	might	not	(as	far	as	she	knows)	be	raining	now,	since	she	is	still	trying	to	find	out	what	time	it	is’.	
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Let	>	abbreviate	the	counterfactual	conditional.		By	(i),	∀𝑝(¬(𝑝	↔	N𝑝)	>	N¬(𝑝	↔	N𝑝)).		By	(iii)	 this	 is	 equivalent	 to	 ∀𝑝(¬(𝑝	↔	N𝑝)	 >	 ¬(N𝑝	↔	NN𝑝)),	 and	 hence,	 given	 (iv),	 to	∀𝑝(¬(𝑝	↔	N𝑝)	 >	 ¬(N𝑝	↔	N𝑝)).	 	 But	 ¬(N𝑝	↔	N𝑝)	 is	 a	 contradiction,	 so	 by	 (ii),	∀𝑝□(𝑝	↔	N𝑝).)25		To	resist	this	argument,	proponents	of	Perpetuity	must	deny	one	of	(i)–(iv).		We	will	focus	on	(i),	although	we	also	have	some	doubts	about	(ii)	and	(iii).		Granted,	it	generally	seems	fine	to	insert	and	delete	‘now’s	in	the	consequents	of	ordinary	counterfactuals.		But	since	most	of	the	counterfactuals	we	ordinarily	consider	have	antecedents	which	could	have	been	true	now,	it	is	tendentious	to	abstract	from	this	pattern	a	rule	which	licenses	such	 insertions	 and	 deletions	 even	 in	 counterfactuals	 whose	 antecedents	 could	 not	possibly	have	been	true	now.		For	example,	‘now’	seems	not	to	be	redundant	in	‘If	we	were	at	a	philosophy	conference	in	the	year	2500,	we	would	probably	not	be	talking	about	any	issue	now	regarded	as	important.’	Analogously,	in	evaluating	ordinary	counterfactuals	we	freely	help	ourselves	to	the	actual	laws	of	nature	(see	Goodman	2015	and	Dorr	2016),	but	it	would	be	very	tendentious	to	extract	from	this	practice	a	general	principle	to	the	effect	that	the	actual	laws	would	have	been	true	no	matter	what.26	
V. 		
A	second	argument	for	Symmetry	appeals	to	the	following	two	premises:			 ACT	 Every	proposition	is,	always,	true	if	and	only	if	actually	true.		∀𝑝	A(𝑝	↔	@𝑝)	RIG@	 Every	actually	true	proposition	is	necessarily	actually	true.	∀𝑝(@𝑝	→	□@𝑝)		For	the	same	reason	that	NOW	and	RIGN	jointly	imply	Supervenience,	ACT	and	RIG@	jointly	imply	 Supervenience*	 (the	 result	 of	 interchanging	 temporal	 and	 modal	 operators	 in	
                                               25	Thanks	to	John	Hawthorne	for	suggesting	this	argument.			26	Note	too	that	there	is	no	need	for	defenders	of	Perpetuity	to	make	a	once-and-for-all	choice	 as	 regards	 which	 premise	 to	 give	 up:	 given	 the	 context-sensitivity	 of	counterfactuals,	one	could	reasonably	maintain	that	(i)	holds	in	some	contexts	while	(ii)	holds	in	others.	
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Supervenience),	and	hence	also	imply	Supervenience	and	Symmetry	(which	we	showed	to	be	equivalent	to	Supervenience*	in	§III).27		Assuming	propositional	temporalism,	they	also	can	be	used	to	generate	explicit	counterexamples	to	Perpetuity:	whenever	𝑝	is	temporarily	true,	the	proposition	that	𝑝	is	actually	true	is	necessarily	true,	by	ACT	and	RIG@,	and	yet	sometimes	false,	by	ACT.		We	do	not	deny	that	both	(the	English	versions	of)	ACT	and	RIG@	have	readings	on	which	they	express	obvious	truths.28		But	English	sentences	involving	‘actually’	often	have	several	readings,	and	we	see	little	reason	to	think	there	is	any	non-equivocating	reading	of	ACT	and	RIG@	on	which	both	are	true.29		The	acceptability	of	sentences	like	‘I	could	have	actually	 run	 you	 over!’	 shows	 that	 adding	 ‘actually’	 sometimes	 makes	 no	 discernible	difference	to	truth	conditions.		Read	in	the	corresponding	way,	the	following	principle	is	true:		 ACT□	 Every	proposition	is,	necessarily,	true	if	and	only	actually	true.		But	on	 the	 interpretation	 corresponding	 to	 this	one,	RIG@	 is	 false,	 since	 together	with	ACT□	it	would	entail	that	every	truth	is	a	necessary	truth.			Our	 opponents	 might	 object	 to	 our	 assimilation	 of	 ACT	 to	 ACT□	 by	 pointing	 to	 a	contrast	 between	 the	 ways	 ‘actually’	 embeds	 in	 temporal	 and	 modal	 environments.	Consider:				 (1)	 a.	 The	climate	could	be	warmer	than	it	actually	is.	
                                               27	ACT	and	RIG@	are	also	both	valid	on	the	class	of	product	models	enriched	to	interpret	@	in	the	manner	described	in	§II.	28	However,	 see	 Yalcin	 2015	 for	 reasons	 to	 doubt	 that	 RIG@	 admits	 a	 true	 reading	 in	ordinary	English.			29	There	are	a	number	of	ways	in	which	this	multiplicity	might	be	generated.		On	one	view	(Crossley	and	Humberstone	1977),	the	word	‘actually’	is	ambiguous,	having	a	‘rhetorical’	use	on	which	it	is	semantically	inert,	and	a	separate	‘logical’	use	characterized	by	RIG@.		On	a	second	view	(Correia	2007;	inspired	by	Vlach	1973),	‘actually’	is	more	flexible,	and	has	the	effect	that	the	sentence	it	embeds	is	evaluated	as	if	it	occurred	at	some	wider	scope	in	 the	 sentence;	 on	 its	 most	 natural	 implementation,	 this	 view	 treats	 ‘actually’	 as	 a	bindable	operator,	introducing	structural	ambiguities	analogous	to	those	introduced	by	variables.		On	a	third	view	(Yalcin	2015),	‘actually’	is	strictly	speaking	semantically	inert,	although	it	may	provide	clues	to	the	resolution	of	certain	structural	ambiguities	which	are	present	in	the	‘actually’-free	sentence.			
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	 b.	 The	climate	will	be	warmer	than	it	actually	is.		(1a)	 is	 fine,	whereas	 (1b)	sounds	odd,	 at	 least	out	of	 the	blue.30		 (Our	 informants	said	things	like	‘That	is	not	the	right	way	to	say	it	in	English—you	should	say	“now”	rather	than	“actually”’.)		So	our	opponents	might	argue	as	follows:	(1b)	is	infelicitous	because	it	is	false	on	all	readings;	the	falsity	of	(1b)	is	best	explained	by	a	more	general	principle	from	which	it	follows	that	ACT	is	true	on	all	readings;	hence,	since	it	is	agreed	that	RIG@	is	true	on	at	least	one	reading,	it	follows	that	there	is	at	least	one	reading	on	which	both	are	true,	so	that	the	argument	against	Perpetuity	goes	through.	We	think	that	this	argument	fails	at	the	first	step	(which	is	not	to	concede	that	the	rest	of	the	argument	is	unproblematic).		Although	there	is	a	contrast	between	(1a)	and	(1b)	as	regards	the	ease	of	accessing	true	readings,	with	the	right	setup—for	example,	when	a	certain	fiction,	misapprehension,	or	only	recently	ruled	out	hypothesis	about	the	current	climate	is	salient—(1b)	can	sound	fine.	There	are	also	theoretical	reasons	to	think	that	(1b)	has	a	true	reading.	Consider	the	results	of	deleting	‘actually’	from	(1a)	and	(1b):			 (2)	 a.	 The	climate	could	be	warmer	than	it	is.		 b.	 The	climate	will	be	warmer	than	it	is.		(2b)	clearly	has	a	true	reading,	and	in	view	of	the	equivalence	of	(2a)	and	(1a),	it	is	hard	to	 see	 how	 the	 addition	 of	 ‘actually’	 in	 (1b)	 could	 prevent	 it	 from	 having	 a	 parallel	reading.31	The	infelicity	of	(1b)	discourse	initially	is	an	instance	of	a	general	feature	of	‘actually’	that	has	nothing	to	do	with	temporal	environments.		In	response	to	the	question	‘What	do	you	do?’,	it	would	be	odd	to	reply	‘Actually	I	am	a	doctor’.		No	doubt	this	is	because	the	usual	role	of	‘actually’	is	to	signal	some	kind	of	surprise	or	contrast,	or	that	something	is	
                                               30	If	you	are	having	trouble	accessing	the	required	non-epistemic	reading	of	‘could’	in	(1a),	consider	instead	‘He	could	work	harder	than	he	actually	does’.				31	Of	course,	(2b)	has	a	trivially	false	reading	too.	But	when	the	present	tense	occurs	in	a	past-tense	 environment	 (with	 or	 without	 ‘actually’)	 a	 reading	 analogous	 to	 the	 true	reading	of	(2b)	is	forced—e.g.	 ‘It	used	to	be	colder	than	it	[actually]	is’.	 	See	Wehmeier	2004	and	Mackay	2013.	
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being	corrected,	or	the	like	–	when	it	is	not	clear	from	context	how	it	could	play	any	of	these	roles,	it	is	typically	infelicitous.	In	view	of	this	generalization,	the	striking	fact	is	that	(1a)	is	felicitous	out	of	the	blue,	or,	more	generally,	that	‘actually’	embeds	more	happily	under	certain	modals	than	elsewhere.	But	we	will	not	speculate	about	the	explanation	of	this	fact,	since	we	see	no	reason	to	think	that	it	bears	on	the	question	of	this	paper.32			One	might	reply	that	even	if	the	use	of	@	that	makes	RIG@	unambiguously	true	is	a	philosopher’s	 invention,	 it	is	 intelligible	and	useful.	 	We	agree.	 	But	clearly	we	have	no	business	having	pre-theoretic	judgments	about	the	truth	of	ACT	when	@	is	introduced	in	part	by	the	stipulation	that	RIG@	is	true.			Another	way	to	introduce	@	as	a	piece	of	philosopher’s	jargon	is	to	appeal	explicitly	to	the	metaphysics	of	possible	worlds:	we	could	introduce	a	name	‘α’	for	the	actual	world,	and	let	‘@𝑝’	abbreviate	‘𝑝	is	true	at	α’.		But	on	this	interpretation,	the	right	way	to	assess	ACT	and	RIG@	is	again	not	on	the	basis	of	their	pre-theoretical	plausibility,	but	as	part	of	some	broader	theory	about	possible	worlds.	 	In	the	next	section	we	consider	how	such	theories	bear	on	Perpetuity.			
VI. 		
Philosophers	 writing	 about	 possible	 worlds	 often	 take	 the	 following	 principles	 for	granted:			
Leibnizian	Possibility:	A	proposition	is	possibly	true	if	and	only	if	it	is	true	at	some	possible	world.	
◇𝑝	↔	∃𝑤(At	𝑤	𝑝)	
Conjunction:	The	conjunction	of	two	propositions	is	true	at	a	possible	world	if	and	only	if	both	of	those	propositions	are	true	at	that	world.	At	𝑤	(𝑝	∧	𝑞)	↔	(At	𝑤	𝑝	∧	At	𝑤	𝑞)	
Negation:	The	negation	of	a	proposition	is	true	at	a	possible	world	if	and	only	if	that	proposition	is	not	true	at	that	world.		
                                               32	See	Mackay	2017	for	a	presupposition-theoretic	account	of	the	felicity-conditions	for	‘actually’.			
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At	𝑤	¬𝑝	↔	¬At	𝑤	𝑝	
Historicity:	 Possible	worlds	 that	 agree	 about	 how	 things	 always	 are	 agree	 about	everything.	∀𝑝(At	𝑤	A𝑝	↔	At	𝑤′	A𝑝)	→	∀𝑝(At	𝑤	𝑝	↔	At	𝑤′	𝑝)				These	 principles	 jointly	 imply	 Symmetry,	 given	 a	 further	 principle	 that	 is	 valid	 in	 the	background	logic:		
Encylopedia:	Some	permanent	truth	necessitates	every	permanent	truth.	∃𝑞(A𝑞	∧	∀𝑝(A𝑝	→	□(𝑞	→	𝑝)))		(Proof:	We	will	derive	Supervenience,	which	is	equivalent	to	Symmetry.		Let	ℎ	witness	the	truth	of	Encylopedia.		We	first	show	that	any	two	worlds	𝑤	and	𝑤′	at	which	ℎ	is	true	agree	about	everything.		Let	𝑝	be	any	proposition.		If	𝑝	is	always	true,	then	the	proposition	that	𝑝	is	always	true	is	itself	always	true,	and	thus	necessitated	by	ℎ.		So	ℎ	∧	¬A𝑝	is	not	possible;	by	Leibnizian	Possibility	it	is	true	at	no	world;	so	by	Conjunction	and	Negation,	A𝑝	is	true	at	every	world	where	ℎ	is	true,	and	in	particular	at	𝑤	and	at	𝑤′.		If	on	the	other	hand	𝑝	is	not	always	true,	then	the	proposition	that	𝑝	is	not	always	true	is	always	true,	and	thus	necessitated	by	ℎ.		So	ℎ	∧	A𝑝	is	not	possible;	by	Leibnizian	Possibility	it	is	true	at	no	world;	so	by	Conjunction,	A𝑝	is	neither	true	at	𝑤	nor	true	at	𝑤′.		So	for	any	𝑝,	A𝑝	is	true	at	both	or	neither	of	𝑤	and	𝑤′,	which	by	Historicity	 implies	that	𝑤	and	𝑤′	agree	about	everything.		Next,	 to	 establish	 Supervenience,	 suppose	𝑝	 is	 true.	 	 Then	𝑝	∧	ℎ	 is	 true,	 and	 therefore	possible,	and	therefore	true	at	some	world	𝑤	by	Leibnizian	Possibility.		By	Conjunction,	ℎ	and	𝑝	are	both	true	at	𝑤,	so	by	the	result	just	established,	𝑝	is	true	at	every	possible	world	at	which	ℎ	is	true.		So	by	Negation	and	Conjunction,	there	is	no	possible	world	at	which	ℎ	∧	¬𝑝	is	true,	and	hence	by	Leibnizian	Possibility	ℎ	∧	¬𝑝	is	not	possible:	𝑝	is	necessitated	by	the	permanent	truth	ℎ.)	Since	 propositional	 eternalism	 is	 a	 common	 presupposition	 of	 theorizing	 about	possible	worlds,	it	is	worth	checking	that	the	four	principles	above	are	compatible	with	propositional	 temporalism.	 	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 by	 observing	 that,	 unlike	 propositional	eternalism,	 all	 four	 principles	 are	 valid	 on	 the	 class	 of	 product	 models	 from	 §II.	 	 In	
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combination	 with	 propositional	 temporalism,	 these	 principles	 suggest	 a	 “changing	pluriverse”	way	of	 thinking	about	 time	and	modality.	 	A	proposition	 is	metaphysically	possible	just	in	case	it	is	true	at	some	world.	 	But	the	facts	about	what	is	true	at	which	worlds	 are	 temporary,	 so	 some	 of	 the	 propositions	 that	 are	 possible	 today	 will	 be	impossible	tomorrow.33		Like	many	other	metaphysicians,	we	think	it	is	dangerous	to	let	one’s	opinions	about	modal	questions	be	driven	by	one’s	theory	of	possible	worlds,	rather	than	the	other	way	around.	So	we	do	not	think	it	is	much	of	a	count	against	the	conjunction	of	Perpetuity	and	propositional	temporalism	that	it	requires	giving	up	at	least	one	of	Leibnizian	Possibility,	
Conjunction,	Negation,	and	Historicity.			How	should	friends	of	Perpetuity	and	propositional	temporalism	think	about	worlds	and	truth	at	a	world?		Perhaps	the	simplest	option	is	to	give	up	Historicity,	keep	the	other	three	principles,	and	think	of	possible	worlds	as	“points	in	logical	space”,	corresponding	to	 propositions	 𝑝	 which	 are	 possibly	 modally	 maximal	 truths,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	
◇(𝑝	∧	∀𝑞(𝑞	→	□(𝑝	→	𝑞))).34	Alternatively,	we	could	preserve	Historicity,	thinking	of	possible	worlds	as	“possible	histories”,	 corresponding	 to	 propositions	 𝑝	 which	 are	 possibly	 modally	 maximal	
permanent	truths:	◇(A𝑝	∧	∀𝑞(A𝑞	→	□(𝑝	→	𝑞))).	When,	in	the	course	of	a	possible	history,	a	proposition	is	sometimes	true	and	sometimes	false,	the	world	is	not	enough	to	settle	its	truth	value.35		To	figure	out	which	of	the	other	three	principles	fails,	we	need	to	decide	what	it	means	for	a	proposition	to	be	true	“at”	a	world.		There	are	two	obvious	options.		The	 first	 holds	 that	𝑝	 is	 true	 at	𝑤	 just	 in	 case	𝑝	 is	 necessitated	 by	 the	world-history	
                                               33 	The	 changing	 pluriverse	 picture	 is	 not	 the	 only	 way	 of	 combining	 propositional	temporalism	with	 the	 four	principles.	 	One	 could	 instead	adopt	a	view	on	which	 facts	about	what	is	true	at	a	given	possible	world	are	both	permanent	and	necessary,	but	which	things	are	possible	worlds	is	a	temporary	matter,	so	that	any	given	possible	world	is	only	possible	for	an	instant.					34	In	the	generalized	Montagovian	structures	of	§III,	this	condition	is	satisfied	by	all	and	only	the	singleton	subsets	of	the	domain.	35	In	generalized	Montagovian	 structures	 this	 condition	 is	 satisfied	by	all	 and	only	 the	equivalence	classes	of	temporally	accessible	points.	
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corresponding	 to	𝑤.	 	 This	 preserves	Conjunction	but	 requires	 giving	 up	Negation	 and	
Leibnizian	Possibility.36		This	view	also	rejects	the	following	principle:		
Disjunction:	The	disjunction	of	 two	propositions	 is	 true	at	a	possible	world	 if	and	only	if	one	of	those	propositions	is	true	at	that	world.	At	𝑤	(𝑝	∨	𝑞)	↔	(At	𝑤	𝑝	∨	At	𝑤	𝑞)		The	second	option	holds	that	𝑝	is	true	at	𝑤	just	in	case	𝑝	is	compossible	with	the	world-history	corresponding	to	𝑤.		On	this	approach,	Leibnizian	Possibility	and	Disjunction	hold,	but	Conjunction	and	Negation	fail.37		Moreover,	for	any	𝑝,	𝑝	∨	A¬𝑝	will	be	compossible	with	every	world-history	despite	being	contingent,	and	will	thus	be	a	counterexample	to:		
Leibnizian	Necessity:	A	proposition	is	necessarily	true	if	and	only	if	it	is	true	at	every	possible	world.	□𝑝	↔	∀𝑤(At	𝑤	𝑝)		 On	 both	 the	 “pointy”	 and	 “historic”	 conceptions,	 worlds	 correspond	 to	 certain	propositions,	only	one	of	which	is	true.		Call	this	world	‘α’	(‘the	actual	world’)	and	interpret	‘@’	as	synonymous	with	‘At	α’.		Assuming	Perpetuity	and	propositional	temporalism,	we	know	 from	 the	 previous	 section	 that	 at	 least	 one	 of	 ACT	 and	 RIG@	must	 fail	 on	 this	interpretation.		In	fact,	since	the	all	the	views	we	have	considered	make	facts	about	what	is	 true	at	 a	world	non-contingent,	 they	all	preserve	RIG@	and	 thus	 reject	ACT.	 	On	 the	pointy	conception,	and	on	the	historic	conception	with	the	compossibility	interpretation	of	‘At’,	any	temporarily	true	𝑝	is	a	counterexample	to	ACT:	@𝑝	is	necessarily	true,	hence	always	 true,	 so	𝑝	↔	@𝑝	 is	 only	 temporarily	 true.	 On	 the	 historic	 conception	with	 the	necessitating	interpretation	of	‘At’,	any	temporarily	false	𝑝	is	a	counterexample	to	ACT:	@𝑝	is	necessarily	false,	hence	always	false,	so	again	𝑝	↔	@𝑝	is	only	temporarily	true.	
                                               36	Let	𝑝	 be	 some	 temporary	 truth.	 	Then	𝑝	∧	¬A𝑝	 is	 true,	 and	 so	possibly	 true,	but	not	possibly	 always	 true,	 and	 hence	 not	 necessitated	 by	 any	 possible	 world-history,	 in	violation	of	Leibnizian	Possibility;	and	at	least	one	possible	history,	viz.	the	true	one,	only	necessitates	truths	and	hence	fails	to	necessitate	the	negation	of	𝑝	∧	¬A𝑝,	in	violation	of	
Negation.	37	Where	𝑝	is	a	temporary	truth,	the	true	world-history	is	compossible	both	with	𝑝	and	with	 ¬𝑝,	 in	 violation	 of	 Negation,	 and	 not	 compossible	 with	 𝑝	∧	¬𝑝,	 in	 violation	 of	
Conjunction.	
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Our	attitude	towards	the	argument	for	Symmetry	from	ACT	and	RIG@	on	the	world-theoretic	interpretation	is	the	same	as	our	attitude	to	the	argument	considered	earlier	in	this	section:	 ‘possible	world’	is	enough	of	a	term	of	art	that	we	are	unperturbed	by	the	prospect	of	giving	up	one	of	these	two	principles.			Indeed,	 in	 view	 of	 the	 potential	 for	 equivocation	 between	 pointy	 and	 historic	conceptions	of	worlds,	we	think	it	best	to	avoid	‘world’-talk	altogether	in	theorizing	about	temporary	matters.		But	if	forced	to	choose,	we	would	favor	the	pointy	conception,	since	
Leibnizian	 Possibility	 and	 Leibnizian	 Necessity	 seem	 particularly	 central	 for	 the	 usual	applications	of	world-talk.		Moreover	there	are	three	further	reasons	to	dislike	the	historic	conception,	at	least	when	combined	with	a	necessitating	or	compossibility	interpretation	of	truth	at	a	world:	first,	it	seems	arbitrary	to	choose	between	Leibnizian	Possibility	and	
Leibnizian	 Necessity;	 second,	 it	 seems	 arbitrary	 to	 choose	 between	 Conjunction	 and	
Disjunction;	and	third,	the	failure	of	truth	to	be	coextensive	with	truth	at	the	actual	world	runs	completely	counter	to	the	way	philosophers	are	used	to	talking	about	worlds.38					
                                               38 	These	 three	 further	 problematic	 features	 are	 not	 inevitable	 consequences	 of	 the	historic	conception	of	worlds.		Instead	of	a	necessitating	or	compossibility	interpretation	of	‘At	𝑤’,	one	could	adopt	a	counterfactual	interpretation,	on	which	a	proposition	is	true	at	a	world	if	and	only	if	it	would	have	been	true	had	the	corresponding	world-history	been	true.		Given	the	Strong	Centering	principle,	according	to	which	counterfactuals	with	true	antecedents	have	the	same	truth	value	as	their	consequents,	this	analysis	preserves	the	coextensiveness	 of	 truth	 with	 truth	 at	 the	 actual	 world.	 	 Conjunction	 holds;	 given	
Perpetuity	 and	 propositional	 temporalism,	 Leibnizian	 Possibility	 fails.	 	 In	 order	 to	 get	
Disjunction	 to	 hold	 we	 need	 Conditional	 Excluded	 Middle,	 in	 which	 case	 Leibnizian	
Necessity	 will	 also	 fail.	 	 Negation	 holds	 assuming	 that	 only	 counterfactuals	 with	metaphysically	impossible	antecedents	are	vacuously	true.	 	Another	interesting	feature	of	the	view	is	that,	unlike	the	views	considered	in	the	main	text,	it	preserves	ACT.		On	the	other	 hand	 RIG@	 and	 its	 converse	 both	 fail	 (assuming	 Perpetuity	 and	 propositional	temporalism),	since	the	property	of	being	true	at	the	actual	world	is	one	that	temporary	truths	have	only	contingently.		Another	analysis	yielding	similar	results	holds	that	𝑝	is	true	at	𝑤	just	in	case	whichever	time	is	present	is	such	that	possibly,	𝑤’s	world-history	and	𝑝	are	both	true	and	that	time	is	present.		But	if	the	present	time	could	fail	to	be	ever	present,	as	we	will	argue	in	§IX,	this	view	will	require	giving	up	Negation.	
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VII. 	
We	 turn	 finally	 to	 a	more	 abstract	 and	 theoretical	 strategy	 for	 arguing	 for	 Symmetry.	Consider	the	following	schematic	premises:		
F-Supervenience:	Every	truth	is	necessitated	by	some	type-F	truth.	∀𝑝(𝑝	→	∃𝑞(𝑞	∧	F𝑞	∧	□(𝑞	→	𝑝))	
F-Eternalism:	Every	type-F	truth	is	always	true.	∀𝑝((𝑝	∧	F𝑝)	→	A𝑝)		Together	 these	 premises	 immediately	 imply	 Supervenience,	 and	 hence	 Symmetry.		Moreover,	 there	 are	 various	 interpretations	 of	 ‘type-F	 propositions’	 on	 which	 both	premises	of	this	argument	have	some	plausibility,	such	as	propositions	about	how	things	are	in	“metaphysically	fundamental”	respects,	propositions	about	microphysics,	and	(of	particular	interest)	spacetime-theoretic	propositions.		Since	Einstein	and	Minkowski,	we	have	learnt	to	characterize	the	physical	world	in	terms	of	the	distribution	of	field-values	in	 four-dimensional	 spacetime,	 rather	 than	 the	 evolution	 of	 field-values	 in	 three-dimensional	space.		It	is	natural	to	think	that	there	is	already	something	temporal	about	points	of	spacetime,	so	that	it	makes	no	sense	to	suppose,	for	example,	that	a	particular	spacetime	 point	 will	 change	 from	 having	 a	 low	 mass-density	 to	 having	 a	 high	 mass	density,	just	as	it	would	make	no	sense	to	suppose	that	a	particular	instant	of	time	will	change	from	being	one	at	which	it	is	raining	to	being	one	at	which	it	is	not	raining.		And	given	a	broadly	physicalistic	outlook,	the	success	of	this	way	of	doing	physics	supports	the	thesis	that	all	truths	supervene	on	truths	about	the	distribution	of	physical	fields	in	spacetime,	perhaps	by	way	of	the	thought	that	only	such	truths	are	fundamental	and	all	truths	supervene	on	the	fundamental	truths.39			This	 strikes	 us	 as	 an	 important	 line	 of	 argument.	 	 But	 it	 also	 looks	 to	 us	 like	 an	argument	 for	 propositional	 eternalism.	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 see	 how	 it	 could	 persuade	 a	propositional	temporalist	to	accept	Symmetry,	since	it	is	unclear	what	could	motivate	F-
                                               39	Bacon	(2018)	defends	a	view	on	which	all	fundamental	truths	are	eternal,	and	on	which	they	jointly	necessitate,	but	do	not	eternally	imply,	the	non-fundamental	truths.	
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Supervenience	without	also	motivating	the	stronger	thesis	that	for	every	truth	there	is	a	type-F	truth	that	always	necessitates	 it.	 	One	obviously	cannot	appeal	 to	 the	claim	that	every	truth	is	a	type-F	truth.		One	might	try	appealing	to	the	thesis	that	every	truth	is	in	some	sense	 “determined”	or	 “grounded”	by	a	 type-F	 truth.	 	But	 if	grounding	 is	simply	identified	with	necessitation,	this	is	question-begging,	while	if	it	is	understood	in	some	other	way,	it	is	hard	to	see	why	grounded	truths	should	be	necessitated	by	the	truths	that	ground	 them,	given	 that	 they	need	not	be	 eternally	 implied	by	 the	 truths	 that	ground	them.		
F-Supervenience	 and	 F-Eternalism	 have	 further	 puzzling	 consequences	 on	 the	assumption	 that	 there	 are	 temporarily	 true	 qualitative	 propositions. 40 		 Let	 an	 F-possibility	be	a	possibly-true	proposition	that	conjoins	F-Supervenience	with	a	maximally	specific	 type-F	 proposition.	 	 Assuming	 that	 being	 type-F	 is	 a	 necessary	 property	 of	propositions,	 every	 F-possibility	 necessitates	 every	 proposition	 with	 which	 it	 is	compossible.41		 For	 example,	 each	 F-possibility	either	 necessitates	 that	 the	 number	 of	stars	is	odd,	or	necessitates	that	it	is	not	odd.		But	if	there	is	qualitative	change,	there	will	presumably	be	many	F-possibilities	that	necessitate	that	the	number	of	stars	is	sometimes	but	not	always	odd.			The	division	of	these	F-possibilities	into	those	that	necessitate	that	the	number	of	stars	is	odd	and	those	that	necessitate	that	it	isn’t	odd	seems	like	it	must	exhibit	 a	 certain	 arbitrariness	 that	 we	 should	 hope	 to	 avoid	 when	 such	 purported	necessary	connections	are	at	issue.		One	might	 try	 to	mitigate	 such	 arbitrariness	 by	 postulating	 that	 there	 is	 a	 certain	three-dimensional	slice	𝑠	through	spacetime,	such	that	what	propositions	an	F-possibility	necessitates	is	a	function	of	what	it	says	about	𝑠.		For	example,	perhaps	an	F-possibility	necessitates	that	the	number	of	stars	is	odd	when	it	entails	that	𝑠	contains	an	odd	number	
                                               40	This	is	not	an	inevitable	commitment	of	propositional	temporalism:	Dorr	(MS)	develops	a	 form	 of	 propositional	 temporalism	 on	 which	 only	 non-qualitative	 (haecceitistic)	propositions	can	be	temporarily	true.		The	arbitrariness	worries	we	are	about	to	raise	do	not	arise	in	any	obvious	way	for	proponents	of	F-Supervenience	who	accept	this	view.	41 	If	 being	 type-F	 is	 a	 contingent	 property	 of	 propositions,	 we	 could	 redefine	 an	 F-possibility	as	a	possibly-true	conjunction	which,	for	each	proposition,	specifies	whether	it	is	type-F	or	not,	and	if	it	is	specified	to	be	type-F,	specifies	whether	it	is	true	or	not,	and	also	has	F-Supervenience	itself	as	a	conjunct.		
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of	appropriately	shaped,	high-temperature	subregions.		(Presumably	this	proposal	will	be	combined	with	the	claim	that	which	region	of	spacetime	is	modally	distinguished	in	this	way	 is	 constantly	 changing.)	 	 But	 this	 suggestion	 introduces	 new	 problems.	 	 First,	 in	distinguishing	one	slice	through	spacetime	as	special	in	this	way,	the	proposal	conflicts	with	what	is	widely	taken	to	be	a	basic	moral	of	relativity	physics.42		Second,	it	is	in	tension	with	the	following	claims:	(i)	if	F-Supervenience	is	true,	then	so	too	is	the	analogous	thesis	restricted	 to	 purely	 qualitative	 propositions,	 namely	 that	 every	 qualitative	 truth	 is	necessitated	by	a	qualitative	 spacetime-theoretic	proposition;	 (ii)	 there	are	pairs	of	F-possibilities	that	agree	on	all	qualitative	spacetime-theoretic	propositions	but	disagree	as	regards	the	qualitative	spacetime-theoretic	role	played	by	𝑠.43		For	example,	if	two	such	F-possibilities	 disagree	 as	 regards	 whether	 𝑠	 contains	 an	 odd	 number	 of	 high-temperature	star-shaped	regions,	the	proposed	special	status	for	𝑠	will	require	them	to	necessitate	incompatible	qualitative	propositions,	in	violation	of	(i).		Thirdly,	the	proposal	breaks	down	when	we	consider	metaphysical	possibilities	in	which	𝑠	 is	not	part	of	the	spacetime	manifold	at	all:	for	example,	possibilities	where	spacetime	undergoes	an	early	gravitational	collapse.		(We	will	have	more	to	say	about	such	possibilities	in	§IX.)	
                                               42	Bacon	(2018)	suggests	a	response	to	this	sort	of	worry:	although	𝑠	is	specially	related	to	a	large	family	of	properties	and	relations	which	includes	being	a	star,	being	spherical,	
being	more	massive	 than,	 etc.,	 this	 is	 just	 one	 of	many	 structurally	 similar	 families	 of	properties	and	relations,	and	every	slice	is	specially	related	to	its	own	such	family.	Bacon	further	claims	that	these	families	of	properties	and	relations	are	all	‘on	a	par’,	so	that	𝑠	is	not	special	in	any	objectionable	sense.		But	we	think	that	in	the	relevant	sense	of	‘on	a	par’,	namely	being	equally	natural	in	the	sense	of	Lewis	(1983),	the	different	families	are	not	on	a	par.	For	the	members	of	the	familiar	family	that	contains	being	a	star	are	easier	to	refer	to	than	their	counterparts	in	other	families	(which	typically	require	special	devices	like	metric	tense	operators	to	express),	which	is	good	reason	to	think	them	more	natural:	see	Dorr	and	Hawthorne	2012.	 	 (The	 fact	 that	reference	also	has	counterparts	 in	other	families,	 each	of	which	 is	 similarly	easy	 for	people	 to	stand	 in	to	 the	members	of	 that	family,	does	not	undermine	this	point.)	43 	(ii)	 will	 be	 denied	 by	 “modal	 anti-haecceitists”,	 according	 to	 whom	 all	 truths	 are	necessitated	by	qualitative	truths,	and	perhaps	also,	depending	on	the	shape	of	spacetime,	by	“metric	essentialists”	like	Maudlin	(1990).			
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VIII. 		
Having	addressed	a	range	of	arguments	for	Symmetry,	in	this	section	and	the	next	we	will	go	on	 the	offensive	and	develop	 two	arguments	against	Symmetry.	 	The	basic	 thought	behind	both	arguments	is	 that	it	 is	contingent	what	times	there	are.	 	This	is	a	plausible	idea.		Moreover,	its	plausibility	is	independent	of	the	plausibility	of	Perpetuity,	and	so	it	is	dialectically	 appropriate	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 defence	 of	 Perpetuity.	 Indeed	 Fine,	immediately	 after	 presenting	 the	 product	 model	 theory,	 suggests	 that	 the	 account	 is	‘perhaps	 over-simple’,	 and	 that	 a	 ‘more	 sophisticated’	 account	 would	 allow	 for	contingency	as	regards	what	times	there	are	(Fine	1977:	167).	Our	first	argument	turns	on	there	being	contingency	as	regards	the	cardinality	of	the	time	series.		A	nice	feature	of	this	argument	is	that	it	can	be	formalized	in	a	way	that	does	not	explicitly	talk	about	times	at	all,	using	instead	only	tense	operators	and	propositional	quantifiers.		For	any	natural	number	𝑛,	the	claim	that	the	time-series	has	a	cardinality	of	at	least	𝑛	can	be	formalized	as	the	claim	that	there	are	𝑛	propositions,	each	of	which	is	sometimes	true,	and	no	two	of	which	are	ever	both	true.		And	although	our	basic	language	ℒ	 does	 not	 contain	 the	 resources	 to	 distinguish	 different	 infinite	 cardinalities	 that	 the	time-series	might	have,	 there	are	 several	natural	 extensions	of	ℒ	which	do	allow	such	distinctions	to	be	drawn.		For	example,	we	could	add	higher-order	quantifiers,	e.g.	into	the	position	 of	 𝑛-ary	 sentential	 operators,	 which	 would	 allow	 us	 to	 adapt	 standard	 set-theoretic	ways	of	characterizing	different	infinite	cardinalities.		Or	we	could	move	to	an	infinitary	language	in	which	the	analogues	of	the	above	finite	quantified	claim	could	be	expressed	directly.		Or	we	could	simply	add	the	standard	future	and	past	tense	operators	G	 and	 H,	 which	 make	 it	 possible	 to	 formulate	 various	 claims	 about	 the	 before-after	structure	of	the	time-series	which	(intuitively	and	model-theoretically)	have	cardinality-theoretic	implications,	although	they	are	strictly	stronger	than	any	mere	cardinality	claim.		For	example,	using	these	tense	operators	together	with	propositional	quantifiers,	we	can	say	that	the	time-series	is	a	discrete,	dense,	or	continuous	linear	ordering.44	
                                               44	For	 the	expression	of	 such	claims	 see	Burgess	 (2002).	 	Relational	 structures	 can	be	straightforwardly	extended	to	interpret	G	and	H	by	supplementing	them	with	a	transitive,	
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We	maintain	that	such	cardinality-theoretic	claims	are	metaphysically	contingent.		For	example,	it	is	metaphysically	possible	for	time	to	be	structured	either	like	the	integers,	like	the	rationals,	or	like	the	real	numbers.	This	judgment	is	bolstered	by	the	judgment	that	the	structure	of	spacetime	is	contingent	in	parallel	ways:	spacetime	could	have	been	continuous,	discrete,	dense	but	countable,	etc.	 	 	Admittedly,	such	possibility	claims	are	controversial:	 they	 will	 be	 denied,	 for	 example,	 by	 those	 who	 identify	 metaphysical	possibility	with	physical	possibility.	 	Moreover,	 it	 is	a	vexed	question	exactly	what	 the	connection	is	between	the	metaphysics	of	spacetime	and	the	metaphysics	of	time.		But	it	would	 be	 extremely	 surprising	 if	 there	 were	 no	 such	 connection:	 it	 is	 not	 a	 mere	coincidence	that	spacetime	and	time	are	both	continuous	(or	both	discrete,	or	both	dense-but-countable,	as	the	case	may	be).			In	 addition	 to	 contingency	 in	 the	 cardinality	 of	 the	 time-series,	 our	 argument	will	require	two	other	premises.	The	first—which	we	don’t	expect	to	be	controversial—is	that	if	Symmetry	 is	 true,	 then	 it	 is	necessarily	always	true.	 	The	second	 is	 that	metaphysical	
modality	 is	 not	 a	 source	 of	 temporariness	 in	 its	 own	 right.	 	 The	 thought	 is	 that	 the	attribution	of	metaphysical	possibility	or	necessity	 to	an	eternal	proposition	results	 in	another	 eternal	 proposition.	 Intuitively,	 an	 eternal	 proposition	 is	 one	 that	 is	 non-temporary	not	just	de	facto	but	of	its	nature.		However	this	status	is	understood,	clearly	A𝑝	should	count	as	eternal	for	any	𝑝,	and	clearly	□A(𝑝	→	A𝑝)	should	be	true	for	any	eternal	𝑝.	 	 Thus,	 if	 the	 underlying	 thought	 about	 eternalness	 is	 true	 under	 any	 reasonable	interpretation,	so	is		
                                               asymmetric	relation	<	on	the	domain,	required	to	be	such	that	𝑥	≈A	𝑦	just	in	case	𝑥	=	𝑦	or	𝑥	<	𝑦	or	𝑦	<	𝑥:		⟦Gφ⟧𝑔	=	{𝑥	∈	I	:	𝑦	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔	for	all	𝑦	such	that	𝑥	<	𝑦}	⟦Hφ⟧𝑔	=	{𝑥	∈	I	:	𝑦	∈	⟦φ⟧𝑔	for	all	𝑦	such	that	𝑦	<	𝑥}			This	language	contains	sentences	which	are	true	at	a	point	if	and	only	if	the	<-ordering	restricted	to	points	temporally	accessible	from	it	is	discrete;	similarly	for	being	discrete	and	bounded,	being	unbounded,	being	dense,	being	dense	and	Dedekind-complete,	and	other	properties	which	settle	the	cardinality	of	temporally	accessible	points.	
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Eternity:	Necessarily	always:	if	a	proposition	is	necessarily	always	true,	it	is	always	necessarily	always	true.				∀𝑝(□A(□A𝑝	→	A□A𝑝))		We	 think	 that	 Eternity	 is	 attractive	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 and	 not	 merely	 because	 it	 is	 a	consequence	of	(the	necessary	permanent	truth	of)	Perpetuity.		For	example,	Eternity	will	appeal	to	those	attracted	to	the	idea	that	eternal	truths	are	“accessible	from	a	God’s	eye	point	of	view”	in	a	way	that	temporary	truths	are	not,	since	one	would	expect	that	if	the	truth	of	a	proposition	is	open	to	God’s	view,	then	so	too	is	its	modal	status.45	To	see	why	Eternity	and	the	necessary	eternal	truth	of	Symmetry	are	inconsistent	with	contingency	 in	 the	 cardinality	 of	 the	 time	 series,	 first	 note	 that	 that	Eternity	 logically	implies	that	the	Church-Rosser	principle	from	§III—∀𝑝(◇A𝑝	→	A◇𝑝)—is	true	necessarily	and	always.		(Proof:	suppose	that	◇A𝑝.		Then	by	temporal	S5,	AS◇SA𝑝,	i.e.	A¬A□A¬A𝑝.		So	by	 the	 contrapositive	 form	 of	 Eternity,	 A¬□A¬A𝑝,	 i.e.	 A◇SA𝑝,	 which	 implies	 A◇𝑝	 by	temporal	S5.46)		Given	this	result,	the	inconsistency	we	are	interested	in	follows	from	a	result	 proved	 in	 §III,	 namely	 that	 any	 relational	 structure	 in	 which	 Symmetry	 is	necessarily	 always	 true	 and	 Church-Rosser	 is	 both	 necessarily	 and	 always	 true	 is	isomorphic	 to	 a	 product	 structure.	 	 In	 any	 such	 structure,	 all	histories	have	 the	 same	cardinality,	 so	 any	 sentence	 entailing	 contingency	 in	 the	 cardinality	 of	 the	 time	 series	must	be	false.47	
                                               45	The	tension	between	this	way	of	thinking	and	Symmetry	is	perhaps	unsurprising,	since	the	idea	that	contingent	questions	can	be	“objective”	in	a	way	that	temporary	questions	cannot	be	involves	a	breaking	of	the	symmetry	between	time	and	modality.			46 	The	 reverse	 is	 true	 as	 well:	 Eternity	 follows	 in	 the	 background	 logic	 from	 the	combination	 of	 □(Church-Rosser)	 and	 A(Church-Rosser),	 since	 as	 shown	 in	 §III	 these	jointly	 imply	 the	 commutativity	 principle	 ∀𝑝□A(□A𝑝	↔	A□𝑝)	 and	 hence	∀𝑝□A(□AA𝑝	↔	A□A𝑝),	which	is	trivially	equivalent	to	Eternity.	47	In	 fact,	 just	 from	 the	 truth	of	Church-Rosser	 and	A(Symmetry)	 in	a	model,	 it	 already	follows	that	there	is	no	point	𝑥	modally	accessible	from	ι	such	that	𝑥’s	history	is	smaller	than	ι’s	(where	the	history	of	a	point	is	the	set	of	all	points	temporally	accessible	from	it).		For	by	Church-Rosser,	ι	is	square-completing,	so	for	every	point	in	ι’s	history,	there	is	some	point	in	𝑥’s	history	is	modally	accessible.		If	ι’s	history	had	a	larger	cardinality	than	𝑥’s,	it	would	have	to	contain	two	distinct	points	from	which	the	same	point	in	𝑥’s	history	was	modally	 accessible.	 	 But	 since	modal	 accessibility	 and	 temporal	 accessibility	 are	 both	equivalence	relations,	these	two	points	would	be	both	modally	and	temporally	accessible	to	 one	 another,	 and	 would	 therefore	 not	 be	 unaccompanied,	 which	 cannot	 happen	 if	
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As	noted	above,	our	simple	language	ℒ	lacks	the	resources	to	say	that	the	cardinality	of	 the	 time	 series	 is	 infinite,	 or	 to	 distinguish	 between	 different	 possible	 infinite	cardinalities	of	the	time	series.	But	it	does	allow	us	to	talk	about	finite	cardinalities,	and	since	 some	might	want	 to	 escape	 the	 present	 objection	 to	 Symmetry	 by	 rejecting	 our	background	 logic,	 it	 may	 be	 instructive	 to	 consider	 object-language	 arguments	 from	
Eternity	and	(the	necessary	permanent	truth	of)	Symmetry	to	the	falsehood	of	particular	claims	to	the	effect	that	there	are	𝑛	times	and	could	have	been	more	or	fewer	than	𝑛	times.		An	especially	easy	case	is	that	of	cardinality	1.		Insofar	as	the	general	idea	of	contingency	in	the	cardinality	of	the	time	series	is	well-motivated,	it	is	hard	to	deny	that,	as	a	limiting	case,	there	could	have	been	exactly	one	time:	i.e.	that	it	could	have	been	that	everything	true	 was	 always	 true	 (◇∀𝑝(𝑝	→	A𝑝)).	 	 But	 given	 Eternity,	 this	 claim	 directly	 implies	
Perpetuity,	and	is	thus	inconsistent	with	the	combination	of	Symmetry	and	propositional	temporalism.		For	suppose	□𝑞.		Then	□□𝑞;	so	◇(□𝑞	∧	∀𝑝(𝑝	→	A𝑝)),	so	◇A□𝑞.		By	Eternity	this	yields	A◇A□𝑞;	but	 this	 implies	A◇□𝑞	 (by	the	 factivity	of	A)	and	hence	A𝑞	(by	the	modal	B	schema).	 	 Similar	arguments	 can	be	given	 for	 finite	 cardinalities	greater	 than	one.48	
                                               A(Symmetry)	is	true	in	the	model.		By	similar	reasoning,	the	truth	of	□(Church-Rosser)	and	□A(Symmetry)	 is	 enough	 to	 guarantee	 that	 no	 point	 modally	 accessible	 from	 ι	 has	 a	history	greater	in	cardinality	than	that	of	ι.			48	Suppose,	for	example,	that	there	are	in	fact	at	least	three	times,	but	there	could	have	been	at	most	two	times:	it	is	possible	that	although	you	only	live	twice,	you	live	forever.		That	is:	(i) ∃𝑝1∃𝑝2∃𝑝3(S𝑝1	∧	S𝑝2	∧	S𝑝3	∧	¬S(𝑝1	∧	𝑝2)	∧	¬S(𝑝1	∧	𝑝3)	∧	¬S(𝑝2	∧	𝑝3))	(ii) ◇∀𝑞1∀𝑞2∀𝑞3((S𝑞1	∧	S𝑞2	∧	S𝑞3)	→	(S(𝑞1	∧	𝑞2)	∨	S(𝑞1	∧	𝑞3)	∨	S(𝑞2	∧	𝑞3)).	We	 will	 derive	 a	 contradiction	 from	 (i),	 (ii),	 Eternity,	 and	 the	 permanent	 truth	 of	
Symmetry.		Since	Symmetry	implies	Supervenience*	(as	explained	in	§III),	Supervenience*	is	always	true:	A∀𝑝(𝑝	→	∃𝑞(A(𝑞	→	𝑝)	∧	□𝑞)).		Hence	∀𝑝A(𝑝	→	∃𝑞(A(𝑞	→	𝑝)	∧	□𝑞))	(by	the	temporal	Converse	Barcan	Formula);	so	∀𝑝(S𝑝	→	S∃𝑞(A(𝑞	→	𝑝)	∧	□𝑞))	(by	the	normal	modal	logic	of	A);	so	∀𝑝(S𝑝	→	∃𝑞S(A(𝑞	→	𝑝)	∧	□𝑞))	(by	the	temporal	Barcan	Formula);	so	∀𝑝(S𝑝	→	∃𝑞(A(𝑞	→	𝑝)	∧	S□𝑞))	(by	temporal	S5).			Instantiating	this	generalization	with	the	three	propositions	𝑝1,	𝑝2,	𝑝3	that	exist	according	to	(i)	guarantees	the	existence	of	corresponding	sometimes-necessary	propositions	𝑞1,	𝑞2,	𝑞3	which	respectively	always	materially	imply	𝑝1,	𝑝2,	and	𝑝3.		By	the	modal	4	axiom,	they	are	 sometimes	 necessarily	 necessary:	 S□□𝑞1	∧	S□□𝑞2	∧	S□□𝑞3.	 	 By	 the	 mirror-image	
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In	summary,	proponents	of	Symmetry	face	a	choice.		They	can	accept	Eternity,	and	deny	that	it	is	contingent	how	many	times	there	are.		Or	they	can	reject	Eternity,	and	hold	that	metaphysical	possibility	and	necessity	are	sources	of	temporariness	in	their	own	right.		The	 implausibility	 of	 both	 options	 constitutes	 an	 argument	 against	 Symmetry	 that	 is	independent	of	judgments	about	Perpetuity.			
IX. 	
Let	us	now	turn	our	attention	to	contingency	in	the	composition	of	the	time	series—i.e.	which	particular	times	are	ever	present.		There	are	three	possible	views:		
Tomorrow	Never	Dies:		Every	time	is	necessarily	sometimes	present.	∀𝑡(□S	Present(𝑡))	
Die	Another	Day:		Some	times,	but	not	the	present	time,	are	possibly	never	present.	∃𝑡(◇¬S	Present(𝑡))	∧	∀𝑡(Present(𝑡)	→	□S	Present(𝑡))	
Live	And	Let	Die:	The	present	time	is	possibly	never	present.			∃𝑡(Present(𝑡)	∧	◇¬S	Present(𝑡))		In	this	section	we	will	first	argue	against	Tomorrow	Never	Dies	and	Die	Another	Day.		We	will	then	argue	that	if	Live	and	Let	Die	is	true,	NOW	(discussed	in	§V)	must	be	rejected,	thereby	undermining		the	most	intuitive	argument	for	Symmetry.			The	 previous	 section	 discussed	 one	 good	 reason	 to	 reject	 Tomorrow	 Never	 Dies,	namely	that	it	is	possible	that	the	time-series	has	a	smaller	cardinality	than	it	in	fact	has.		
                                               Church-Rosser	 principle	 ∀𝑝(S□𝑝	→	□Sp)	 (which	 follows	 from	 Eternity	 as	 explained	above),	□S□𝑞1	∧	□S□𝑞2	∧	□S□𝑞3,	hence	□(S□𝑞1	∧	S□𝑞2	∧	S□𝑞3).	So	by	(ii)	(using	the	modal	Converse	 Barcan	 Formula),	 ◇(S(□𝑞1∧□𝑞2)	 ∨	 S(□𝑞1∧□𝑞3)	 ∨	 S(□𝑞2∧□𝑞3)),	 and	 hence	◇S□(𝑞1∧𝑞2)	∨	◇S□(𝑞1∧𝑞3)	∨	◇S□(𝑞2∧𝑞3).		By	□(Church-Rosser)	(another	consequence	of	
Eternity),	 this	 implies	 ◇□S(𝑞1	∧	𝑞2)	∨	◇□S(𝑞1	∧	𝑞3)	∨	◇□S(𝑞2	∧	𝑞3),	 and	 hence	S(𝑞1	∧	𝑞2)	∨	S(𝑞1	∧	𝑞3)	∨	S(𝑞2	∧	𝑞3).	 	 But	 since	 𝑞1,	 𝑞2,	 𝑞3	 respectively	 always	 materially	imply	𝑝1,	𝑝2	and	𝑝3,	this	implies	that	S(𝑝1	∧	𝑝2)	∨	S(𝑝1	∧	𝑝3)	∨	S(𝑝2	∧	𝑝3),	contradicting	(i).		Unlike	 the	 argument	 about	 cardinality	 1	 in	 the	 main	 text,	 this	 reasoning	 generalizes	straightforwardly	to	other	finite	cardinalities,	but	could	be	resisted	by	rejecting	appeals	to	 the	 temporal	 or	modal	 Barcan	 or	 Converse	 Barcan	 formulae.	 	 However	 it	 unclear	whether	this	way	of	resisting	the	argument	leads	to	a	stable	view.	 	Even	if	we	say	that	none	of	𝑞1,	𝑞2,	and	𝑞3	would	have	existed	had	there	been	only	two	times,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	they	could	nevertheless	all	have	been	sometimes	necessary	without	any	two	of	them	having	been	necessary	together.			
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But	 there	 are	 other	 arguments	 against	 Tomorrow	 Never	 Dies	 that	 don’t	 turn	 on	 that	possibility,	and	which	can	also	easily	be	turned	into	arguments	against	Die	Another	Day.		First,	one	might	argue	from	the	premise	that	there	could	have	been	a	cosmic	catastrophe	in	which	history	itself	came	to	an	end,	so	that	some	times	which	are	in	fact	a	proper	initial	segment	of	the	time	series	would	instead	have	been	the	totality	of	the	time	series.	 	For	example:	should	the	sky	fall	tomorrow,	times	that	will	in	fact	be	present	next	week	would	never	get	to	be	present.		This	argument	generalizes	to	an	argument	against	Die	Another	
Day,	assuming	that	if	such	a	cosmic	catastrophe	is	possible	at	all,	then	there	could	have	been	such	a	catastrophe	some	time	in	the	past,	so	that	the	present	time	would	have	been	absent	 from	 the	 time	 series.	 	 Second,	 one	might	 appeal	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 temporal	relations	between	times	are	essential	to	them,	in	the	sense	that	necessarily,	if	𝑡	is	present	before	𝑡′,	then	it	is	not	possible	that	𝑡	or	𝑡′	ever	be	present	without	𝑡	being	present	before	𝑡′.		Combined	with	the	claim	that	the	before-after	structure	of	the	time	series	could	have	been	different—e.g.	because	it	is	contingent	whether	time	is	circular,	or	whether	there	is	a	first	or	last	moment—this	essentialist	thesis	implies	that	every	time	is	possibly	never	present,	thus	ruling	out	both	Tomorrow	Never	Dies	and	Die	Another	Day.	(Note	that	the	premises	of	these	two	arguments	are	incompatible,	since	the	essentialist	premise	rules	out	 the	possibility	of	 the	time-series	being	a	proper	 initial	segment	of	 the	actual	 time-series.)		A	third	kind	of	argument	turns	on	theses	about	the	relation	of	time	to	spacetime.		For	example,	one	might	think	that	for	every	time	𝑡	there	is	a	region	of	spacetime	𝑠𝑡	such	that	necessarily,	𝑡	is	part	of	the	time	series	just	in	case	𝑠𝑡	is	an	appropriate	kind	of	part	(a	“simultaneity	slice”)	of	the	spacetime	manifold.		(One	version	of	this	view	identifies	each	time	 𝑡	with	 the	 corresponding	 region	𝑠𝑡.)	 	Contingency	 in	 the	 composition	of	 the	 time	series	 then	 follows	 from	 contingency	 in	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 spacetime	 manifold:	
Tomorrow	Never	Dies	is	ruled	out	if	some	time	corresponds	to	a	region	which	could	have	failed	 to	 be	 a	 simultaneity	 slice,	 and	Die	 Another	 Day	 is	 ruled	 out	 if	 the	 present	 time	corresponds	to	such	a	region.49		Note	that	 all	 three	of	 these	arguments	are	compatible	
                                               49 	Even	 someone	 who	 thought	 that	 the	 composition	 and	 topological	 structure	 of	spacetime	 was	 metaphysically	 non-contingent	 might	 think	 that	 which	 regions	 of	spacetime	 count	 as	 “simultaneity	 slices”	 is	 a	 contingent	 matter—e.g.	 if	 being	 a	
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with	the	necessity	of	the	cardinality	of	the	time-series,	as	well	as	with	the	necessity	of	the	laws	of	physics.50	Those	who	want	 to	maintain	Tomorrow	Never	Dies	 in	 the	 face	 of	 these	 arguments	might	offer	a	rejoinder	inspired	by	Timothy	Williamson’s	defense	of	the	claim	that	it	is	necessary	what	things	there	are	(Williamson	2013).		According	to	Williamson,	there	are	a	great	many	 very	 boring	 things	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 interesting	 ones	with	which	we	 are	familiar.		Since	Wittgenstein	could	have	had	a	child,	there	are	things	that	could	have	been	children	of	Wittgenstein;	but	each	is	a	mere	spectre—it	is	not	a	person,	and	has	no	mass,	has	no	spatial	location,	etc.		Williamson	thinks	that	his	opponents	are,	by	and	large,	right	about	the	ways	in	which	it	is	contingent	what	interesting	things	there	are,	but	fall	into	error	by	 failing	to	 take	boring	things	 into	account.	 	Defenders	of	Tomorrow	Never	Dies	might	analogously	suggest	that	we	have	fallen	into	error	by	confusing	the	true	claim	that	it	 is	 a	 contingent	 matter	 which	 times	 are	 interesting	 with	 the	 false	 claim	 that	 it	 is	 a	contingent	matter	which	 times	 are	 sometimes	 present.	 	 	 “Boring”	 times	 could	 then	 be	characterized	as	times	at	which	all	objects	are	boring,	in	the	sense	in	which	Wittgenstein’s	possible	children	are	boring	on	Williamson’s	view.			Even	those	who	are	happy	with	Williamson’s	defense	of	necessitism	have	reasons	to	be	cautious	about	 this	strategy.	 Just	as	Williamson	counters	 the	claim	that	 there	could	have	been	things	that	are	not	actually	anything	by	saying	that	there	actually	are	boring	
                                               simultaneity	slice	 is	being	a	Cauchy	surface	of	constant	mean	curvature	(see	Belot	and	Earman	 2001:	 239–40	 and	 references	 therein)	 and	 there	 is	 a	 reasonable	 amount	 of	contingency	as	regards	the	distribution	of	matter	in	spacetime.	50	One	deviant	way	of	reconciling	the	above	considerations	with	the	letter	of	Tomorrow	
Never	Dies	is	to	adopt	an	eliminativist	view	on	which	there	aren’t	any	times	at	all.		The	less	radical	version	of	this	view	rejects	the	ontology	of	times	but	not	the	devices	of	temporal	anaphora	discussed	in	note	12.		Assuming	such	devices	are	legitimate,	we	can	use	them	to	formulate	eliminativism-friendly	analogues	of	Tomorrow	Never	Dies,	Die	Another	Day,	and	
Live	And	Let	Die,	to	which	the	arguments	of	the	present	section	are	equally	applicable.		A	more	 radical	 version	 of	 eliminativism	 holds	 that	 the	 entire	 notion	 of	 trans-history	simultaneity	is	unintelligible,	so	that	devices	of	temporal	anaphora	cannot	meaningfully	be	 embedded	 under	 modal	 operators.	 	 This	 picture	 renders	 the	 present	 section’s	arguments	redundant,	since	its	proponents	already	reject	NOW	(as	unintelligible).	Similar	points	apply	to	proposals	to	save	the	letter	of	Tomorrow	Never	Dies	by	holding	that	there	is	only	one	time,	namely	the	present.			
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things,	so	too	proponents	of	the	“boring	times”	strategy	will	counter	our	claim	that	there	could	have	been	times	that	are	actually	never	present	by	saying	that	there	actually	are	
sometimes-present	boring	times	(and	indeed,	infinitely	many	of	them).	 	In	other	words:	sometimes,	nothing	is	interesting.		But	isn’t	the	question	whether	there	have	always	been,	and	always	will	be,	interesting	things	(such	as	electrons)	a	question	for	physics,	not	to	be	answered	by	philosophers	from	the	armchair?		Furthermore,	whereas	Williamson	can	and	does	deny	that	boring	objects	bear	nontrivial	spatial	relations	to	interesting	ones	or	to	one	another,	proponents	of	the	“boring	times”	strategy	cannot	likewise	deny	that	boring	times	bear	nontrivial	temporal	relations	to	the	interesting	times	in	which	we	live,	or	to	one	 another—at	 least	 holding	 fixed	 the	 truisms	 that	 anything	 that	 is	 sometimes	 true	either	is,	was,	or	will	be	true,	and	that	no	two	times	are	ever	both	present	at	once.	 	So:	have	you	been	interesting	ever	since	you	were	born?	Are	the	boring	times	clustered	at	one	 or	 other	 end	 of	 the	 time	 series?	 	 And	 how	 are	 boring	 times	 ordered—densely,	discretely,	continuously,	or	in	some	other	way?		These	embarrassing	questions	suggest	that	the	present	strategy	is	unlikely	to	provide	a	solid	dialectical	basis	for	a	defense	of	
Tomorrow	Never	Dies.	Let	us	now	return	to	Die	Another	Day.		Even	setting	aside	the	arguments	above,	there	is	something	bizarre	about	the	proposal	that	some	times	are	modally	robust	(necessarily	sometimes	present)	in	a	way	that	other	times	are	not.		Moreover,	on	pain	of	arbitrariness,	anyone	who	thinks	that	the	present	time	is	modally	robust	should	accept	the	more	general	principle	that	every	time	is	modally	robust	when	it	is	present.51		In	combination	with	Die	
Another	Day,	this	general	principle	entails	that	modal	robustness	is	a	temporary	feature	of	times.		And	this	consequence	is	inconsistent	with	Eternity,	which	we	defended	in	§VIII.	That	principle	says	that	metaphysical	necessity	is	not	itself	a	source	of	temporariness	—	
                                               51	Note	that	∀𝑡A(Present(𝑡)	→	□Present(𝑡)),	and	hence	the	disjunction	of	Tomorrow	Never	
Dies	and	Die	Another	Day,	is	valid	in	the	generalized	product	structures	described	in	§III	(interpreting	‘Present’	and	‘∀𝑡’	as	explained	in	§II),	since	in	such	models	⟨𝑤,	𝑡⟩	is	modally	accessible	 from	 ⟨𝑤′,	𝑡′⟩	 only	 when	 𝑡	=	𝑡′.	 	 These	 models	 provide	 the	 natural	 way	 of	generalizing	product	models	to	allow	for	contingency	in	the	composition	or	cardinality	of	the	time	series.	 	Whereas	Tomorrow	Never	Dies	 is	valid	in	product	models,	it	can	fail	in	generalized	product	structures.		For	example,	in	a	generalized	product	structure	where	I	=	{⟨0,1⟩,	⟨0,2⟩,	⟨1,0⟩,	⟨1,2⟩,	⟨2,0⟩,	⟨2,1⟩},	Tomorrow	Never	Dies	is	false	at	every	point.	
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necessitation	never	turns	an	eternal	proposition	into	a	temporary	one.	But	according	to	the	view	under	consideration,	each	time	𝑡	that	is	only	contingently	ever	present	generates	a	counterexample	to	Eternity,	since	although	the	proposition	that	𝑡	is	sometimes	present	is	eternal,	its	necessitation	is	temporary	(false	now,	but	true	when	𝑡	is	present).		Having	just	argued	for	Live	And	Let	Die	by	arguing	against	its	two	alternatives,		we	will	now	argue	that	it	implies	the	falsity	of	NOW,	as	follows:		 (1)	 The	present	time	is	possibly	never	present.	∃𝑡(Present(𝑡)	∧	◇¬S	Present(𝑡))	(2)		 So	the	present	time	is	not	necessarily	present.	∃𝑡(Present(𝑡)	∧	¬□Present(𝑡))	(3)	 So	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 that	 all	 and	 only	 true	 propositions	 are	 true	 at	 the	present	time.	∃𝑡(Present(𝑡)	∧	¬□∀𝑝(𝑝	↔	At	𝑡	𝑝))	(4)	 So	not	every	proposition	is,	necessarily,	true	just	in	case	true	at	the	present	time.			∃𝑡(Present(𝑡)	∧	¬∀𝑝□(𝑝	↔	At	𝑡	𝑝))	(5)	 So	not	every	proposition	is,	necessarily,	true	just	in	case	now	true.			¬∀𝑝□(𝑝	↔	N𝑝)		(1)	is	Live	and	Let	Die;	(5)	is	the	negation	of	NOW.	We	will	discuss	each	step	in	turn.			From	(1)	to	(2):	The	validity	of	this	inference	follows	from	the	plausible	claim	that	for	something	to	be	never	true	just	is	for	it	to	neither	be	true,	have	been	true,	nor	be	going	to	be	true.		Thus	nothing	could	possibly	be	both	present	and	never	present.		If	you	disagree	with	us	about	this,	we	can	without	any	loss	of	plausibility	replace	Live	and	Let	Die	with	the	claim	that	the	present	time	could	have	been	neither	present,	formerly	present,	nor	ever	going	to	be	present,	and	never	say	‘never’	again.					From	(2)	to	(3):	Say	that	𝑡	is	accurate	just	in	case	all	and	only	the	true	propositions	are	true	at	𝑡.		(2)	implies	(3)	so	long	as	being	accurate	necessitates	being	present.		This	is	true	on	all	of	the	most	natural	accounts	of	the	connection	between	‘present’	and	‘At	𝑡’:		 (a)	 To	be	present	is	to	be	accurate.	
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(b)	 For	𝑝	to	be	true	at	𝑡	is	for	it	always	to	be	the	case	that	if	𝑡	is	present,	𝑝	is	true.	(c)	 For	𝑝	to	be	true	at	𝑡	is	for	it	sometimes	to	be	the	case	that	𝑡	is	present	and	𝑝	is	true.		(d)	 For	𝑝	 to	be	true	at	𝑡	 is	 for	 it	 to	be	the	case	that	𝑝	would	be	true	 if	𝑡	were	present.52				For	(a),	the	implication	from	accuracy	to	presence	is	immediate.			For	(b)	and	(d),	it	follows	from	the	 fact	 that	 the	proposition	that	𝑡	 is	present	cannot	 fail	 to	be	true	at	𝑡,	 so	 if	𝑡	 is	accurate	this	proposition	must	be	true.	For	(c),	it	follows	from	the	fact	that	the	proposition	that	𝑡	is	not	present	cannot	be	true	at	𝑡,	so	if	𝑡	is	accurate	this	proposition	must	be	false.			Are	there	any	principled	views	about	the	connection	between	‘present’	and	‘at	t’	that	could	allow	for	the	possibility	of	accuracy	without	presence?		One	might	suggest	a	view	on	which	things	that	are	never	present	get	to	count	as	accurate	‘by	courtesy’,	as	in	the	following	variant	of	(c):		 (e)		 For	𝑝	to	be	true	at	𝑡	is	for	it	to	be	the	case	that	either	it	is	sometimes	the	case	that	(𝑝	is	true	and	𝑡	is	present),	or	𝑝	is	true	and	𝑡	is	never	present.		This	view	blocks	the	implication	from	accuracy	to	presence	and	thus	from	(2)	to	(3).		The	problem	with	 it	 is	 that	 it	is	 incompatible	with	the	principle	 that	what	 is	 true	at	𝑡	 is	an	eternal	matter:	∀𝑡□∀𝑝(At	𝑡	𝑝	→	A	At	𝑡	𝑝).		For	presumably,	if	the	present	time	could	have	been	never	present,	then	propositional	temporalism	could	still	have	been	true	in	such	a	possibility:	 that	 is,	 there	 could	have	been	 some	 temporarily	 true	proposition.	 (e)	 then	entails	that	the	present	time	is	such	there	could	have	been	a	proposition	that	was	true	at	
                                               52 	(b),	 (c),	 and	 (d)	 are	 temporal	 analogues	 to	 the	 three	 accounts	 of	 truth	 at	 a	 world	compatible	with	the	combination	of	Perpetuity	and	Historicity	considered	in	§VI.		If	it	is	contingent	what	times	are	sometimes	present,	(b)	and	(c)	entail	that	‘At	𝑡’	fails	to	commute	with	negation	in	modal	contexts,	whereas	(d)	preserves	commutativity	given	Conditional	Excluded	Middle.			
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it	but	not	always	true	at	it.		This	is	bizarre:	how	could	it	have	been	sometimes	raining	now	and	sometimes	not	raining	now?53,	54	From	(3)	to	(4):	The	validity	of	this	inference	follows	from	the	validity	of	the	modal	Barcan	 Formula,	 ∀𝑝□φ	→	□∀𝑝φ.	 	 Those	 who	 think	 that	 there	 could	 have	 been	propositions	in	addition	to	those	there	actually	are	might	thus	consider	resisting	at	this	step.	They	might	think	that	the	present	time	is	necessarily	accurate	with	regard	to	all	the	propositions	there	actually	are	(as	required	 for	(4)	 to	be	 false)	while	maintaining	that	there	 could	 have	 been	 new	propositions	whose	 truth	 values	 differed	 from	 their	 truth	values	at	the	present	time	(which	suffices	for	(3)	to	be	true).		However,	there	is	a	different	way	of	arguing	from	(3)	to	(4),	relying	not	on	the	Barcan	Formula	but	instead	on	two	hard-to-deny	principles	about	the	logic	of	‘At	𝑡’:	(i)	‘At	𝑡’	is	closed	under	classical	consequence;	(ii)	 ‘At	𝑡’	 is	redundant	when	it	occurs	within	the	scope	of	 ‘At	𝑡’	without	any	intervening	modal	or	temporal	operators.		(Both	principles	are	consequences	of	the	analyses	(b)–(e)	of	‘At	𝑡’	in	terms	of	‘Present’	considered	above.)		Let	𝑡	be	the	present	time,	and	let	𝑞	be	the	proposition	that	𝑡	is	accurate.	Necessarily,	if	anything	is	true	at	𝑡,	∀𝑝(𝑝	↔	𝑝)	is	true	at	𝑡	by	
                                               53	Those	who	reject	the	factivity	of	‘always’	have	another	way	of	rejecting	the	implication	from	accuracy	to	presence:	they	can	say	that	for	a	time	to	be	present	is	for	it	to	be	both	accurate	and	sometimes	accurate.		We	have	already	said	what	we	have	to	say	against	this	maneuver	in	connection	with	the	step	from	(1)	to	(2).			54	The	views	we	have	just	considered	all	also	entail	that	being	present	necessitates	being	accurate.		For	(a)	this	is	obvious;	for	(b),	(c),	and	(e)	it	follows	from	the	principle	that	no	time	is	present	more	than	once	(i.e.	that	if	sometimes	𝑡	is	present	and	𝑝	is	true,	then	always	if	 𝑡	 is	present	𝑝	 is	 true);	 for	 (d)	 it	 follows	 from	“strong	centering”	 for	 counterfactuals,	according	to	which	a	counterfactual	with	a	true	antecedent	has	the	same	truth	value	as	its	consequent.	 	Relying	only	on	 the	 implication	 from	presence	 to	accuracy,	we	can	 run	a	different	argument	against	NOW,	replacing	Live	And	Let	Die	with	the	stronger	premise	that	the	present	time	could	have	been	absent	from	the	time	series	without	any	new	times	being	included	in	it	(e.g.	because	time	came	to	an	end	before	now).		We	can	articulate	this	possibility	in	a	language	with	plural	quantification	over	times,	as	follows:	
The	Living	Daylights:	There	are	some	𝑡𝑡	such	that	none	of	𝑡𝑡	is	present;	each	of	𝑡𝑡	is	sometimes	present;	and	possibly	always	one	of	𝑡𝑡	is	present.	If	such	tt	exist,	then	at	least	one	of	them	𝑡	is	possibly	present,	and	so	possibly	accurate:	◇∀𝑝(𝑝	↔	At	𝑡	𝑝).	 	 Instantiating	 NOW+	 (□∀𝑡	At	𝑡	∀𝑝□(𝑝	↔	At	𝑡	𝑝))	 with	 𝑡,	 we	 have	◇∀𝑝□(𝑝	↔	At	𝑡	𝑝),	 hence	◇□(¬Present(𝑡)	↔	At	𝑡	 ¬Present(𝑡)),	 hence	 (by	 the	 modal	 B	schema),	¬Present(𝑡)	↔	At	𝑡	¬Present(𝑡).		Since	𝑡	is	not	present	this	gives	At	𝑡	¬Present(𝑡).		But,	 uncontroversially,	 every	 time	 is	 present	 at	 itself.	 	 So	 proponents	 of	 The	 Living	
Daylights	must	reject	NOW+,	and	hence,	as	we	argued	in	§V,	should	also	reject	NOW.	
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(i),	 in	 which	 case	 ∀𝑝(𝑝	↔	At	𝑡	𝑝),	 i.e.	 𝑞,	 is	 also	 true	 at	 𝑡	 by	 (ii).	 	 Now	 suppose	 for	contradiction	 that	 (3)	 is	 true	and	 (4)	 is	 false.	 	By	 (3),	¬𝑞	 is	possibly	 true.	 	And	by	 the	negation	of	(4),	every	proposition	(including	¬𝑞)	is,	necessarily,	true	just	in	case	true	at	𝑡.	Hence	it	is	possible	that	¬𝑞	is	true	at	𝑡.		But	by	the	earlier	result,	it	is	necessary	that	𝑞	is	true	at	𝑡	if	anything	is.		So	by	(i),	it	is	possible	that	𝑞	∧	¬𝑞	is	true	at	𝑡;	hence	by	the	falsehood	of	(4),	it	is	possible	that	𝑞	∧	¬𝑞:	contradiction.		We	thus	see	no	plausible	way	to	resist	the	step	from	(3)	to	(4).	From	 (4)	 to	 (5):	 This	 step	 should	 be	 uncontroversial.	 (Some	 might	 reject	 the	
equivalence	of	(4)	and	(5)	on	the	grounds	that	that	there	are	no	times,	but	even	they	will	accept	the	relevant	material	implication.)	This	concludes	our	argument	against	NOW.	 	 It	 is	addressed,	in	 the	 first	 instance,	 to	those	who,	when	confronted	with	the	tension	between	NOW	and	Perpetuity,	were	initially	inclined	to	find	NOW	the	more	plausible	principle.55		But	the	falsity	of	NOW	also	causes	
                                               55	Several	people	have	suggested	to	us	that	proponents	of	Symmetry	should	retreat	from	NOW	to	the	following	weaker	claim:	WEAK	NOW	Necessarily,	if	things	are	ever	as	they	now	are,	things	are	as	they	now	are.		□(S∀𝑝(𝑝	↔	N𝑝)	→	∀𝑝(𝑝	↔	N𝑝))			Advocates	of	Symmetry	who	are	worried	about	NOW	might	take	a	quantum	of	solace	in	the	fact	that	Symmetry	can	also	be	derived	from	WEAK	NOW	together	with	RIGN.			(Proof:	uncontroversially,	∀𝑞(𝑞	↔	Nq).		So	AS∀𝑞(𝑞	↔	Nq).		Moreover,	for	any	true	𝑝,	we	have	N𝑝,	hence	by	RIGN,	AN𝑝.		Thus	N𝑝	∧	S∀𝑞(𝑞	↔	Nq)	is	an	eternal	truth,	and	by	WEAK	NOW,	one	that	necessitates	𝑝.	 	So	Supervenience	 is	 true:	every	truth	 is	necessitated	by	an	eternal	truth.	 	Symmetry	 follows.)	 	But	WEAK	NOW	seems	completely	unmotivated	apart	 from	being	 a	 consequence	 of	NOW.	 	Moreover,	 even	WEAK	NOW	 is	 in	 tension	with	 certain	natural	 claims	 about	 the	 extent	 of	 contingency	 in	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 time	 series,	specifically	The	Living	Daylights	 (see	note	52).	 	 For	 just	 as	proponents	of	NOW	should	accept	 the	 more	 general	 NOW+,	 proponents	 of	 WEAK	 NOW	 should	 accept	 the	 more	general	WEAK	NOW+:	WEAK	NOW+:	Necessarily,	at	each	time,	it	is	necessary	that	if	things	are	ever	as	they	then	are,	things	are	as	they	then	are.		□∀𝑡	At	𝑡	□(S∀𝑝(𝑝	↔	At	𝑡	𝑝)	→	∀𝑝(𝑝	↔	At	𝑡	𝑝))	But	WEAK	NOW+	is	inconsistent	with	The	Living	Daylights	for	the	same	reason	that	NOW+	is	(see	note	54):	The	Living	Daylights	entails	that	some	temporarily	non-present	time	𝑡	is	possibly	present,	hence	possibly	accurate,	hence	by	WEAK	NOW+	possibly	necessarily	accurate-if-sometimes-accurate,	 hence	 in	 fact	 accurate,	 which	 no	 temporarily	 non-present	time	is.	
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trouble	for	those	who	accept	Symmetry	on	some	other	grounds,	and	thus	reject	Perpetuity.	Consider	 the	question:	which	possibly	 sometimes-true	propositions	are	possibly	 true?	According	 to	 proponents	of	Perpetuity:	 all	 of	 them.	According	 to	 proponents	of	NOW:	those	that	are	possibly	true	now.	But	what	about	people	who	reject	both	Perpetuity	and	NOW?	 	 They	 must	 think	 that	 some	 but	 not	 all	 propositions	 that	 could	 have	 been	sometimes	true	but	could	not	have	been	true	now	are	possibly	true.	If	they	accept	(the	necessary	eternal	truth	of)	Symmetry,	they	must	also	think	that,	for	each	possible	world-history,	 there	 is	a	unique	time	 in	that	history	which	could	have	been	present	had	that	history	obtained.	Given	the	falsity	of	NOW,	this	function	from	possible	world-histories	to	members	of	their	respective	time-series	cannot	be	the	constant	function	that	maps	every	history	to	the	present	time.		But	it	is	hard	to	see	how	this	function	could	then	fail	to	draw	arbitrary	distinctions	of	a	sort	that	ought	to	disqualify	it	from	marking	the	boundaries	of	metaphysical	possibility.	
X. 	
Someone	 might	 accept	 everything	 we	 have	 said	 up	 to	 this	 point	 while	 nevertheless	regarding	 the	 dispute	 we	 have	 been	 engaged	 in	 as	 “merely	 verbal”.	 	 Perhaps	 our	opponents	 mean	 something	 different	 from	 us	 by	 the	 term	 of	 art	 ‘metaphysically	necessary’,	such	that	(a)	‘Every	metaphysically	necessary	truth	is	always	true’	is	false	as	used	by	 them,	and	 (b)	both	our	way	of	 talking	and	our	opponents’	way	of	 talking	are	“equally	good”.		In	particular,	one	might	suggest	that	our	opponents	use	‘metaphysically	necessary’	 to	 express	 the	 notion	 of	 immediate	 necessity,	where	 this	 can	 be	 defined	 in	terms	of	our	notion	of	metaphysical	necessity	as	follows:	it	is	immediately	necessary	that	φ	just	in	case	the	truth	of	φ	is	a	metaphysically	necessary	consequence	of	the	truth	about	which	time	is	present.		(In	symbols:	□Iφ	=df	∃𝑡(Present(𝑡)	∧	□(Present(𝑡)	→	φ)),	where	𝑡	is	some	time	variable	not	free	in	φ).		For	any	formula	φ,	let	φI	be	the	result	of	substituting	immediate	for	metaphysical	necessity	in	φ	(i.e.	the	result	of	replacing	each	subformula	of	the	form	□ψ	with	□Iψ).	We	can	now	express	the	interpretative	hypothesis	as	follows:	For	any	φ,	φ	as	used	by	our	opponents	is	equivalent	to	φI	as	used	by	us.	
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In	favor	of	this	hypothesis,	one	might	appeal	to	the	following	facts:		 (i)	 Any	 formula	φ	 is	 logically	 equivalent	 to	φI	on	 the	 class	 of	 generalized	 product	structures	from	§III,	interpreting	quantification	over	times	as	discussed	in	§II.	(ii)	 PerpetuityI—∀𝑝(∃𝑡(Present(𝑡)	∧	□(Present(𝑡)	→	𝑝))	→	A𝑝)—is	 uncontroversially	false	assuming	propositional	temporalism,	since	it	entails	that	the	present	time	is	always	present.		(iii)	 SymmetryI—∀𝑝(¬𝑝	→	∃𝑞(∃𝑡(Present(𝑡)	∧	□((Present(𝑡)	∧	𝑝)	→	𝑞)	∧	A(𝑝	→	¬𝑞)))—is	 uncontroversially	 true,	 since	 the	 existential	 generalization	 is	witnessed	by	the	proposition	attributing	presentness	to	the	present	time.		(iv)	 NOWI	is	uncontroversially	true,	since	it	is	uncontroversial	that	the	present	time	is	such	that	necessarily,	if	it	is	present,	then	the	true	propositions	are	exactly	those	propositions	that	are	true	now.		Since	our	opponents	think	that	Symmetry	is	not	only	true	but	necessarily	true,	necessarily	always	true,	and	so	on,	(i)	makes	it	natural	to	think	of	them	as	recognizing	only	one	notion	of	 necessity	where	we	 recognize	 two.	 	 It	might	 therefore	 be	 thought	 that	we	 face	 an	interpretative	dilemma	that	should	be	resolved	by	considerations	of	charity.		And	given	(ii)–(iv),	such	considerations	seem	to	support	the	present	interpretative	hypothesis.				We	are	unmoved	by	this	mode	of	argument.		Philosophers	do	regularly	make	mistakes	about	general	metaphysical	principles,	and	equate	statuses	that	are	in	fact	distinct,	so	the	fact	that	a	certain	interpretation	avoids	attributing	such	errors	is	very	weak	evidence	that	the	 interpretation	 is	correct.	 	But	even	 if	we	were	convinced	that	 there	was	a	practice	afoot	of	using	‘metaphysically	necessary’	to	express	immediate	necessity,	we	would	still	emphatically	reject	the	claim	that	this	way	of	speaking	was	“just	as	good”	as	ours.	 	For	there	 are	 hypotheses	 about	 the	 possible	 structures	 of	 time	 that	 simply	 cannot	 be	expressed		in	the	language	of	tense	operators,	propositional	quantifiers,	and	an	operator	expressing	immediate	necessity.		For	example,	consider	the	following	pair	of	hypotheses:		 H1	 It	is	metaphysically	necessary	that	time	is	dense.	
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H2	 Although	it	is	only	contingently	true	that	time	is	dense,	it	is	necessary	that	for	each	time	𝑡,	either	it	is	necessary	that	if	𝑡	is	ever	present,	time	is	dense,	or	else	it	is	necessary	that	if	𝑡	is	ever	present,	time	is	not	dense.			(Intuitively:	whether	a	time	belongs	to	a	dense	time-series	is	an	essential	property	of	it.)	H1	 and	 H2	 strike	 us	 as	 perfectly	 respectable	 competing	 hypotheses	 about	 the	 modal	metaphysics	of	time,	about	which	there	could	be	a	substantive	debate.		But	there	seems	to	be	no	way	of	conducting	such	a	debate	using	immediate	necessity	as	one’s	basic	modal	notion.	 	For	one	thing,	H2I	 is	 flatly	 inconsistent	and	so	clearly	 fails	as	a	way	of	making	sense	of	H2.		Nor	would	it	help	to	instead	replace	‘metaphysically	necessary’	in	H2	with	‘always	 immediately	necessary’,	or	 ‘immediately	necessarily	always’,	or	with	any	 finite	string	 of	 ‘always’	 and	 ‘immediately	 necessarily’	 operators,	 or	 even	 with	 the	 infinite	conjunction	of	all	such	strings.		We	will	focus	on	this	last	proposal.		Model-theoretically,	the	effect	of	such	a	replacement	is	an	operator	corresponding	to	an	accessibility	relation	which	is	the	transitive	closure	of	the	union	of	the	temporal	accessibility	relation	and	the	“immediate	possibility”	accessibility	relation	(the	relation	one	point	bears	to	another	if	and	 only	 if	 is	 modally	 accessible	 and	 agrees	 about	 which	 time	 is	 present).	 	 Such	 an	operator	 is	 not	 semantically	 equivalent	 to	 metaphysical	 necessity;	 the	 accessibility	relation	so-defined	can	fail	to	be	universal	even	in	a	structure	where	modal	accessibility	is	universal.		In	particular,	H2	is	only	true	in	structures	where	this	relation	fails	to	be	a	universal	relation:	if	H2	is	true,	there	are	possibilities	where	time	is	not	dense,	but	they	cannot	be	reached	by	any	sequence	of	steps	each	of	which	either	takes	you	to	a	different	point	in	the	same	possible	history	or	to	a	different	possible	history	with	the	same	present	time.			By	our	lights,	these	expressive	limitations	constitute	an	important	respect	in	which	a	language	whose	only	modal	operator	is	immediate	necessity	is	inferior	to	ours.		Moreover,	this	 inferiority	 strikes	 us	 as	 a	 strong	 consideration	 against	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 our	opponents	are	in	fact	speaking	such	a	language.			To	 be	 clear,	 we	 are	 not	 advancing	 this	 “expressive	 power”	 consideration	 as	 an	argument	for	Perpetuity.		Our	current	target	is	the	view	that	the	debate	over	Perpetuity	is	
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merely	verbal:	we	have	argued	that	is	not	the	case	that	both	ways	of	speaking	are	equally	good,	on	the	grounds	that	if	our	way	of	speaking	is	good,	our	opponents’	way	of	speaking	is	worse,	since	it	is	expressively	impoverished	relative	to	ours.			We	are	not	claiming	that	it	is	an	important	desideratum	that	a	view	be	neutral	as	regards	hypotheses	like	H1	and		H2;	on	the	contrary,	we	see	settling	such	difficult	questions	as	an	advantage	of	a	theory	about	time	and	modality.		In	metaphysics	as	in	other	areas	of	theory-building,	strength	is	a	virtue.			Our	 impulse	to	defend	Perpetuity	was	 initially	 triggered	by	 incredulity	 that	anyone	would	 deny	 something	 so	 obvious.	 But	 our	 considered	 view	 is	 that	 this	 is	 an	 area	 of	metaphysics	where	surprises	may	well	be	in	store,	and	that	competing	theories	should	be	adjudicated	on	broader	 theoretical	 grounds.	This	 is	why	our	defense	of	Perpetuity	 has	taken	 the	 form	 of	 a	 critical	 investigation	 of	 opposing	 views—in	 particular,	 those	 that	combine	propositional	temporalism	with	Symmetry.	We	have	argued	that	such	views	are	both	under-motivated	and	incompatible	with	plausible	claims	about	contingency	in	the	time-series.	The	competing	picture	that	accepts	Perpetuity	does	not	face	these	problems.	Moreover,	Perpetuity	offers	a	simple	and	compelling	explanation	of	its	enormously	many	obviously	and	uncontroversially	true	instances.		The	balance	of	considerations	thus	tells	firmly	in	its	favor.		No	point	in	history	lies	outside	the	space	of	possibility.		Diamonds	are	forever.56		 	
                                               56Versions	of	this	paper	were	presented	at	the	California	Metaphysics	Conference	at	USC,	the	Jowett	Society	in	Oxford,	the	Yale	Graduate	Conference	in	Philosophy,	and	the	Rutgers	Semantics	 Workshop.	 	 Thanks	 to	 the	 organizers	 of	 these	 events	 and	 to	 all	 who	participated.		For	many	helpful	discussions	over	the	years	this	paper	has	been	in	progress,	we	 thank	Andrew	Bacon,	Kit	 Fine,	 Peter	 Fritz,	 John	Hawthorne,	Øystein	Linnebo,	Ofra	Magidor,	Daniel	Rothschild,	Jeff	Russell,	Philippe	Schlenker,	and	Tim	Williamson.		Special	thanks	to	Juhani	Octopussyli-Vakkuri	for	suggesting	the	title.	
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